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For many years now, Chinese civil society has 
been the focus of considerable expectations 
for scholars, journalists, and politicians 
all over the world. There has been great 
eagerness to salute every small victory by 
Chinese NGOs and activists over the powerful 
party-state as evidence that the authoritarian 
tide was finally receding in China, and that 
grassroots forces were stepping up to take a 
new role in Chinese politics and society. In 
light of these high hopes, it is not surprising 
that the recent troubling news coming from 
China has been acutely disappointing and 
has dampened people’s enthusiasm. With 
the arrest of yet another activist, the airing 
of yet another public confession, the closure 
of yet another NGO working for the weak 
and disenfranchised, and the passing of yet 
another repressive law, the world has come 
to view Chinese civil society as if it were on 
its deathbed. For sure, an idea of Chinese 
civil society is ailing. But, if we consider 
the swiftness with which the party-state 
has tamed these forces (at least for the time 
being), was this civil society ever there in 
first place? Or were we simply projecting our 
hopes onto a handful of Chinese grassroots 
organisations and activists? 
While we mourn the death of an ideal, it 
is imperative that we overcome our sorrow 
to look at the momentous changes that are 
currently taking place in the realm of Chinese 
civil society. In this issue of Made in China, 
we offer a series of perspectives on these 
developments. In Conceptual Confusion 
in the Research on Chinese Civil Society, 
Taru Salmenkari highlights the biases and 
lack of clarity that undermines much of 
the discussion of Chinese civil society. In 
Chinese Grassroots Organisations after the 
Charity Law, Karla Simon and Holly Snape 
consider how the new legislation is likely 
to break down the old order and establish a 
new system of governance. In The Rise of 
Foundations, Jessica Teets examines the 
role of Chinese foundations in providing 
financial assistance to local NGOs now that 
foreign sources of funding are drying up. In 
Meet the State Security, Ivan Franceschini 
looks at the ambivalent relationship between 
labour activists and their controllers from 
the security apparatus. Finally, in Snapshots 
of China’s ‘Uncivil Society’, Børge Bakken 
describes how the attempt by the party-state 
to prevent a civil society from organising 
itself has led to the emergence of a rather 
uncivil type of society.
In this issue you will also find other 
provocative essays. In Collective Bargaining 
Is Dead: The Situation Is Excellent, Eli 
Friedman argues that the recent decline 
in discussions about collective bargaining 
in China is not necessarily bad news, as 
it paves the way for public debate about 
other meaningful policies, such as universal 
basic income. In Making Class and Place 
in Contemporary China, Roberta Zavoretti 
contends that in today’s China, the state-
sponsored discursive production of migrant 
labourers as a homogeneous social group 
sustains the promotion of the hegemonic 
social model of an ideally emerging ‘middle 
class’. In our Window on Asia section, 
Jennifer Hsu shifts the focus from China 
to Myanmar, analysing how Burmese civil 
society has reacted to the challenges posed by 
Chinese aid and investment in the country. In 
Losing the World, Christian Sorace reviews 
Gu Tao’s documentary ‘The last Moose of 
Aoluguya’, about the forced relocation of the 
Evenki people in Northern China. The issue 
concludes with an interview with Andrew 
Kipnis about his latest monograph, From 
Village to City.
The Editors
Fare Thee Well, 
Chinese Civil Society?
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Grisly Murder Brings Back 
Haunting Memories
In December 2016, a court in Beijing handed a 
suspended death sentence to two migrant workers 
from a village in Sichuan province, while three 
others were given jail terms ranging from fifteen 
years to life imprisonment for the premeditated 
murder of a colleague in August 2014. They had 
killed him on a construction site in Shunyi district, 
Beijing, and then had used his corpse to stage a 
fake accident in order to claim compensation from 
the construction company by posing as relatives of 
the victim. Such grisly deeds are not unheard of in 
China. In May 2016, prosecutors in Inner Mongolia 
announced the indictment of seventy-four people 
for the killing of seventeen mine workers in order 
to blackmail mine owners running unlicensed 
operations into paying reparations. In 2009, the 
police discovered that several residents of a village 
in Leibo county, Sichuan province, were involved 
in buying or kidnapping people with severe mental 
problems to sell them as slaves or to kill them in 
mines to get compensation by posing as relatives. 
A similar situation was famously portrayed in Li 
Yang’s haunting movie Blind Shaft, shot in 2003. IF
(Sources: Caixin English; The New York Times)
Foreign NGOs Law Enforced
On 1 January, the controversial Law on the 
Management of Foreign NGOs’ Activities within 
Mainland China came into force. To clarify matters 
in the midst of legal and procedural uncertainty—
the list of agencies allowed to supervise foreign 
organisations and the areas in which these 
organisations can work was released only at the 
end of December—in early January the Ministry 
of Public Security (MPS) set up a webpage with 
an online manual on how to register foreign NGOs. 
Unfortunately, the page remains only in Chinese. 
Roughly at the same time, thirty-six Chinese 
lawyers formed a legal service group to advise 
foreign NGOs and their local partners on matters 
related to the new legislation. Considerable worries 
remain, however, as in early March only three dozen 
organisations, which had registered under other 
labels before the law had come into effect, were 
able to complete the registration process. These 
included the World Economic Forum, Save the 
Children, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 
and several chambers of commerce. Many foreign 
NGOs have simply adopted an attitude of wait 
and see, suspending their activities in China 
until they can observe how other organisations 
will fare in the registration process. According to 
some observers, though, this difficult start does 
not warrant excessive pessimism. In the words of 
civil society scholar Shawn Shieh: ‘My experience 
working with Chinese and foreign NGOs in China 
is that both are quite creative and persistent and 
as long as there are pressing social needs for their 
work, they will find ways to work through or 
around the NGO Law.’ IF
(Sources: China Development Brief; China Law 
Translate; The Diplomat; NGOs in China; South 
China Morning Post)
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The Struggle of Walmart 
Workers Enters a Phase of 
Litigation
In July 2016, the protest of Walmart workers 
against the company’s introduction of a new 
flexible working hour system culminated in a series 
of strikes (see Anita Chan’s chapter in the Made 
in China Yearbook 2016). In the following months, 
the company started undertaking retaliatory 
actions aimed at the labour activists, and coerced 
workers to sign a form stating that they agreed 
to the new working hour system. Those who 
refused met with fierce harassment. Having found 
fault with these workers, Walmart could then 
fire them without having to pay compensation or 
entitlement. At the time of writing, the dismissals 
are still continuing. Some activists have started 
arbitration and litigation procedures against 
Walmart but thus far only a dozen workers have 
been able to take this legal option because of 
the expensive nature of litigation. The Walmart 
Chinese Workers Association (WCWA), the main 
social media platform on which Walmart workers 
communicate, was able to raise fifty thousand yuan 
through crowd-sourced donations at the end of 
last year to fund some of the cases. The prospect of 
workers winning is not high, but the activists have 
vowed to persist in the attempt to set a precedent. 
One worker-activist in Shenzhen, who went after 
Walmart through legal channels for owing her 
money, had the case jettisoned by the arbitration 
committee. Instead of giving up, she filed a second 
case and in a WeChat conversation told us: ‘I’ll 
insist on using the law to protect my rights. This 
time I’ll charge Walmart for retaliation. No matter 
what the outcome will be, I just can’t let them 
bully me this way.’ As for the two WCWA founders, 
Zhang Jun and Zhang Liya, they are not going 
to give up either. To Made in China, one of them 
declared: ‘This experience teaches workers a good 
lesson about the importance of forming their own 
trade union. In the beginning they appealed to the 
official union for help, and now they realise they 
need their own union.’ AC
On 24 March, the Ministry of Public Security 
disclosed that over the past four years nearly 
fourteen million unregistered citizens had been 
provided with household registration documents. 
The beneficiaries of this move—which had been 
called for in an official opinion of the State 
Council released in December 2016—included not 
only homeless people and those who had lost their 
documents, but also orphans and children born 
illegally during the period of strict implementation 
of the one-child policy (known as ‘black children’), 
when families often had no other choice than 
hiding their offspring in order to avoid hefty fines 
or other punishments. To this day, a household 
registration document remains necessary to access 
most public services in China. IF
(Sources: Quartz; State Council; Xinhua)
Fourteen Million People Get 
Household Registration
Supreme People’s Court 
Boasts about Arrests of 
Lawyers
During the ‘Two Sessions’, the President of the 
Supreme People’s Court Zhou Qiang presented his 
annual report about developments in the work of 
the courts during the past year and plans for the 
year to come. As in past reports, the protection of 
human rights features among the work carried out 
by the Chinese judiciary. According to this latest 
report, human rights are guaranteed by the correct 
implementation of criminal justice policies, the 
appropriate use of the death penalty, the respect 
of the right to a presumption of innocence, 
and the right to appeal decisions by the courts. 
Interestingly, however, in the very first section 
of this year’s speech—entitled ‘ensuring state 
security, punishing crime, and protecting human 
rights’—Zhou Qiang singles out the sentencing 
‘according to the law’ of weiquan lawyer Zhou 
Shifeng to seven years in jail as one of the key 
achievements for the protection of state security 
in 2016. EN
(Sources: Minnan Network; South China Morning 
Post; Xinhua)
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Further Job Cuts in the 
Coal and Steel Industry 
Announced
Claims of Physical Violence 
against Lawyer Raise a Storm
China’s annual economic growth in 2016 reached 
the expected target of 6.7 percent, with the creation 
of more than thirteen million new jobs in cities 
and towns. Still, the employment prospects for the 
year ahead remain worrying, as China continues 
to rein in its overcapacity in heavy industries 
such as steel and coal. In a press conference held 
on 1 March, Yin Weimin, the Chinese Minister of 
Human Resources and Social Security, explained 
that arrangements were made in 2016 for 726,000 
workers who had lost their jobs in the steel and coal 
industry. Moreover, he announced that an extra 
500,000 workers will need similar arrangements 
this year. To facilitate this process, the authorities 
have proposed four approaches: workers whose 
skills are applicable to other positions within their 
factories will be reassigned internally; workers 
with skills incompatible to other roles in the same 
factory will be relocated to other places, with the 
government providing them with job training and 
guidance if necessary; workers within five years 
of retirement will be encouraged to retire early; 
finally, a special effort will me made to ensure the 
livelihoods of disadvantaged and older workers 
who do not belong to the first three categories. 
While acknowledging all the difficulties posed by 
such massive job cuts (see also Kevin Lin’s chapter 
in the Made in China Yearbook 2016), the Minister 
believes that the whole process will be smooth. JL
(Sources: Caixin 1; Caixin 2; Renminwang; 
Washington Post)
During the first few months of 2017, the issue 
of torture of Ch¬inese lawyers caught up in the 
‘709 incident’—the crackdown against the ‘rights 
protection’ (weiquan) community that took place 
in July 2015—generated significant attention both 
within and outside China. In January, the legal 
team of human rights lawyer Xie Yang, who was 
detained in Hongjiang, Hunan, on 11 July 2015, 
released the transcript of a conversation they had 
with their client to protest the decision of the 
authorities not to release their client. In it, Xie 
describes the details of the physical and mental 
abuse he has been subjected to while in detention. 
The transcript has resonated widely, particularly 
after 12 January when human rights lawyer Li 
Chunfu emerged from nearly seventeen months in 
police custody in a shattered state, suffering from 
violent bouts of paranoia and with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia. On 27 February, eleven diplomatic 
missions in Beijing wrote a letter to Guo Shenkun—
the Minister of Public Security—expressing their 
‘growing concern over recent claims of torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment in cases concerning detained human 
rights lawyers and other human rights defenders.’ 
As a response, in an unprecedented move, on 1 
March, China’s official media responded to Xie’s 
allegations, and indirectly to the letter, claiming 
that his torture was a story fabricated in order 
to attract international attention. State media 
accused disbarred lawyer Jiang Tianyong—himself 
detained since November 2016—of making up ‘fake 
news’ and featured interviews with him admitting 
to fabricating Xie’s claims of torture. Chinese 
media reported that an ‘independent’ investigation 
by the Hunan Procuratorate found that Xie has not 
been tortured. EN
(Sources: China Change, Global Times, 
Guanchazhe; The Guardian; The Independent; 
The New York Times; Xinhua)
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Talks about Migrant Workers 
at the Two Sessions
At the beginning of March, the annual ‘Two 
Sessions’ of the National People’s Congress (NPC) 
and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Congress (CPPCC) convened in Beijing. On 5 
March, Prime Minister Li Keqiang addressed the 
NPC. In his speech he reiterated once again the 
determination of the government to tackle the 
issue of wage arrears besetting migrant workers. 
The beleaguered situation of migrant workers also 
drew much attention from representatives. Some 
delegates contended that inadequate legislation on 
wage payment, lenient punishment for companies 
violating laws, and weak law enforcement are 
some of the main reasons for the persistence of 
wage arrears in China; they thus suggested that 
the government should reinforce its supervision 
of the labour market—for instance by creating 
a blacklist of law-violating companies and 
imposing stiff penalties on them. Wage arrears 
aside, a special personal income tax scheme was 
proposed, which would take into consideration 
the seasonal fluctuations in migrant workers’ 
wages and therefore help increase their disposable 
income. Moreover, it was recommended that the 
government, in cooperation with firms, provide 
more vocational training to migrant workers to 
help them survive in the era of automation. JL
(Sources: Gongren Ribao; Xinhua 1; Xinhua 2; 
Zhonggongwang)
Over the weekend of 25 March, Feng Chongyi, a 
Chinese-born professor who has been teaching 
for over a decade at the University of Technology 
Sydney, was stopped at immigration checkpoints 
in Guangzhou while he was attempting to take 
flights back to Australia. For a week, he was 
prevented from leaving China and remained in 
a hotel room, subject to interrogation by state 
security agents because of his alleged involvement 
in a threat to national security. He was allowed 
to leave the country on 1 April. Professor Feng, 
who is known for having repeatedly expressed 
critical views about the Chinese government and 
its political dealings in Australia, was in China to 
conduct research on weiquan lawyers during one 
of the worst crackdowns in years. The ‘incident’ 
happened while Prime Minister Li Keqiang was 
on an official visit in Australia to negotiate several 
trade deals, and when the Australian Parliament 
was on the verge of ratifying an extradition treaty 
long in the making with China. On 28 March, 
facing rising public concerns about China’s 
record of the abuse of national security charges 
to quash political dissent, Australian Prime 
Minister Malcom Turnbull called off the vote 
on the extradition treaty. The detention of Feng 
Chongyi followed the disappearance of Lee Ming-
cheh, a Taiwanese human rights advocate, the 
week before. According to friends and relatives, 
on 19 March Lee had boarded a flight from Taipei 
to Macau but he never emerged from the arrivals 
gate. Only ten days later, the Chinese authorities 
confirmed that Lee was detained on vague national 
security charges. At the moment of writing, he 
remains in detention. IF
(Sources: The Guardian; Reuters; The New York 
Times 1; The New York Times 2; The New York 
Times 3)
Chinese-Born Australian 
Scholar Prevented from 
Leaving China
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For many years reform-oriented labour 
activists and scholars working in China have 
seen collective bargaining as the cure for 
the country’s severe labour problems. The 
logic underlying this was often unstated, 
but straightforward: collective bargaining 
was crucial for twentieth century labour 
movements in capitalist countries in giving 
workers a voice and creating a more equitable 
social distribution of wealth. With growing 
levels of labour unrest in China over the 
past twenty years, collective bargaining 
seemed like a logical next step. Hopeful 
reformers—both within the official unions as 
well as labour NGO activists and academics—
envisioned rationalised, legalised bargaining 
between labour and capital as a central pillar 
in the construction of a more just workplace 
and society. 
The challenges to institutionalising a robust 
collective bargaining system in the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) have always been 
profound. Fundamental to labour relations 
theory is that collective bargaining rights 
must be accompanied by the right to strike 
and freedom of association—capital has no 
reason to take workers seriously without 
labour possessing some coercive power. 
But independent unions have long been an 
anathema to the Communist Party. From 
the Lai Ruoyu debacle of the 1950s to the 
crushing of the Beijing Workers Autonomous 
Federation in 1989, the Party has made it 
clear time and again that independent worker 
organisations are forbidden. Although 
workers have never enjoyed the right to strike 
in practice, the right was formally included 
in the Chinese constitutions of 1975 and 1978. 
It was Deng Xiaoping who removed it from 
the constitution just as private capital began 
pouring into China in the early 1980s. 
Working Within the System
Nonetheless, with no signs of articulated 
worker movements since 1989, many well-
Eli Friedman
As the Chinese government under Xi Jinping 
has turned in a markedly anti-worker direction, 
attempts to establish a genuine collective 
bargaining system in China have been smothered. 
If collective bargaining is dead, what might 
Chinese workers and their allies advocate? 
The time might be ripe to shift our focus to a 
demand for a rapid expansion of universal social 
services, not least for a universal basic income.
Collective Bargaining 
in China is Dead: The 
Situation is Excellent
12
Construction workers in Changsha.
Photo: Citizenoftheworld (Flickr)
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intentioned people thought it was worth trying 
to advance worker rights within the system. 
Especially from the mid 2000s on, academics 
(myself included) launched research projects, 
NGOs held training sessions, and foreign 
unions engaged with the All-China Federation 
of Trade Unions (ACFTU). Many assumed 
that the state would eventually decide that 
worker insurgency was exacting too high a 
cost, and that serious labour reforms were 
therefore necessary. And indeed, beginning 
in the late 2000s the ACFTU made collective 
negotiations (xieshang)—rather than the 
more antagonistic sounding ‘bargaining’ 
(tanpan)—a high priority, investing time and 
resources into expanding the coverage of 
collective contracts. 
At its best, collective bargaining in China 
has been woefully inadequate. The state 
and the ACFTU have been very cautious 
about controlling workers’ aspirations, and 
have insisted on the fundamental harmony 
of interests between labour and capital. 
Experiments with bargaining have been 
almost exclusively restricted to single 
enterprises, thereby preventing workers 
from constituting cross-workplace ties. 
The overwhelming majority of collective 
contracts are formulaic: actual bargaining 
rarely occurs, and enforcement is largely non-
existent. The few shining examples where 
employers have made real compromises 
during collective bargaining have followed 
autonomously organised wildcat strikes. 
The best-known case is the 2010 strike from 
a Honda transmission plant in Guangdong 
province, which resulted in major wage 
gains as well as an (ultimately unsuccessful) 
effort to reform the enterprise union. It is 
not coincidental that substantive worker-led 
bargaining is much more likely in Japanese 
or American firms, where the state must be 
cautious not to inflame patriotic sentiments. 
State-sanctioned economic nationalism is 
a shaky foundation for a robust collective 
bargaining system. 
The Death of Collective 
Bargaining under Xi
 
Even these timid efforts have been 
smothered in recent years, as the central 
government has turned in a markedly anti-
worker direction under Xi Jinping. There 
was a brief moment in 2010 when discussion 
about the right to strike emerged from hushed 
whispers into the public discourse. But this 
opening was ephemeral, and union reformers 
in Guangdong who had pushed gentle reforms 
in the mid-late 2000s were replaced with 
typical Party apparatchiks. The country’s pre-
eminent centre for labour studies at Sun Yat-
sen University in Guangzhou was shuttered. 
The academic study of employment has now 
been left almost entirely to business schools, 
as the government has stymied further 
expansion of labour relations programs. 
Labour NGOs in Guangzhou were subjected 
to a brutal crackdown in December 2015, 
with the government specifically targeting 
those groups that had been helping workers 
to engage in collective negotiations to resolve 
strikes. And the ACFTU has seemingly given 
up on advancing collective negotiations 
altogether. The Chairman of the ACFTU 
Li Jianguo does not even mention the term 
in his speeches anymore. Under the ‘work 
developments’ section of the ACFTU’s 
website, a lonely single report on collective 
contracts for the entirety of 2016 is a stark 
indication that the union has almost totally 
forsaken this agenda. 
Collective bargaining is not dead in the 
sense that it will disappear from China’s 
labour-capital relations. It is almost 
certain that official unions will continue to 
pursue bargaining in its current vacuous, 
bureaucratic, and worker-exclusionary form. 
Collective contracts will continue to be 
signed, tabulated, and then hidden from view 
from workers. Somewhat less pessimistically, 
workers will continue to force management 
to bargain with the collective via wildcat 
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strikes. This latter form will still be an 
important means by which workers can 
attempt to ensure their most basic rights, and 
these efforts are absolutely worth supporting. 
But collective bargaining is dead as a political 
aim. It is not going to be the cornerstone of 
twentieth century-style class compromise in 
China, it is not generative of worker power, 
and it certainly does not herald broader 
social transformation. To the extent that 
legal bargaining does develop, it will be as a 
mechanism for the state to deprive workers of 
autonomous power. 
What then might Chinese workers and 
allied intellectuals and activists aim for? At 
the risk of stating the obvious, the working 
class needs more power. The question is, 
how to foster proletarian power in the 
face of a highly competent authoritarian 
state that views organised workers as 
an existential threat? In the absence of 
independent organisations, the only option 
is an intensification of already widespread 
worker insurgency. The more wildcat strikes, 
mass direct action, and worker riots, the 
more the state and capital will be forced to 
take worker grievances seriously. Of course 
such forms of collective action come at great 
risk for workers, and many have already paid 
a high price. In any particular case, the risks 
may certainly outweigh the benefits. But in 
the aggregate, expansive unrest is just what 
the working class needs. With the institutions 
firmly oriented towards advancing the 
inter-related goals of state domination and 
exploitation by capital, disruption on a large 
scale is the only chance workers have of 
forcing change. Ungovernability will be the 
necessary prelude to any institutional reform 
worthy of the name. 
The Quest for Universal 
Basic Income
Let’s now imagine a scenario—a fantastic 
one, admittedly, but one for which we 
should be prepared: worker unrest hits some 
inflection point, and the state comes begging 
for compromise. If collective bargaining is 
dead on arrival, what might Chinese workers 
and their allies advocate? The time has come 
to shift our focus to a demand for a rapid 
expansion of universal social services, not 
least of which should be universal basic 
income (UBI). 
UBI has been hotly debated in North 
America and Europe in recent years. There 
are numerous excellent accounts of various 
ways of structuring UBI, which I cannot 
rehash in detail here. But the fundamental 
idea is that all members within some given 
political jurisdiction receive a certain income 
by virtue of their citizenship—there are no 
means tests, and everyone receives the same 
amount regardless of employment status or 
existing wealth. 
Perhaps the most frequently cited reason 
for implementing UBI is that technological 
development is increasing productivity while 
undermining the stability of jobs. A somewhat 
more expansive version of this argument 
recognises the diverse ways that people 
contribute to capital accumulation outside 
of wage labour—if the traditional wage is 
an increasingly unreliable measure of value 
production, perhaps it should be abandoned 
altogether. Another important point is that 
UBI would have the advantage of freeing up 
time for more socially constructive activities. 
Liberated from the daily struggle for survival, 
people will have the space to do what they 
will—including engaging in politics. In this 
sense, UBI is not merely an end in itself but 
also a means for developing the political 
energies of the dominated.  
UBI is by no means a panacea, and at worst 
it could be a Trojan horse for austerity. 
Many conservatives have come to embrace 
UBI, as they see it as an efficient replacement 
for all other social programs. An additional 
concern is that it is unlikely that elites will 
endow society with the right kind of UBI in 
the absence of vigorous, organised demands 
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from below. A technocratic approach will 
likely serve the interests of elites, or will be 
unenforceable. 
A few exceptions notwithstanding, UBI 
has aroused little discussion within China. 
There are a variety of reasons for this, not 
least of which has been thirty years of nearly 
unbroken economic development and job 
growth. Industries such as manufacturing and 
construction have absorbed huge volumes of 
labour, and automation has only just begun 
chipping away at this growth in employment. 
Ideologically, UBI has resonances with the 
state socialist ‘iron rice bowl’, and runs 
counter to dominant meritocratic discourses 
that valorise hard work. Advocates of UBI 
would likely encounter repression, as the 
state is constitutionally opposed to any 
politics that could articulate the aspirations 
of a broad constituency. Given all of this, UBI 
has not yet gained widespread currency in 
China, and workers have not put it forward 
as a demand. 
Nonetheless, the moment seems ripe to 
raise the topic for debate. Economic growth 
is slowing, automation is accelerating, and 
greater numbers of people are dependent on 
highly informal, contingent, and irregular 
forms of work to survive. Minimum wages 
increased significantly from 2010 until last 
year, but have more recently been frozen 
in many provinces. The growing informal 
workforce does not enjoy minimum wage 
rights, and even formal workers with a 
labour contract often have to protest just to 
have basic laws enforced. Furthermore, the 
minimum wage has never been a liveable 
wage, particularly for migrant workers 
excluded from state-subsidised health care, 
education, and housing. The contradiction 
between China’s highly uneven economic 
geography and localised system of social 
welfare provision on the one side, and its 
unified national labour market on the other, 
is only likely to intensify. UBI cannot be 
realised without widespread working class 
support and mobilisation—now is the time to 
plant the seed.     
Crucial Questions
There are important details that would need 
to be worked out for UBI to be effectively 
implemented, especially in a place as large 
and complex as China. Crucial questions 
about how to fund such a program, how much 
citizens would receive, and the administrative 
arrangements could determine success or 
failure. But even in advance of having a 
perfectly worked out plan, the demand serves 
an important political purpose: it proposes that 
all humans have a right to subsist, irrespective 
of their utility to capital. Particularly given 
China’s highly fractured welfare regime, the 
demand could serve to unify people across 
region, ethnicity, and hukou status. If linked 
to demands for universalising other forms 
of social protection such as healthcare, 
education, and housing, it could lay the 
foundation for meaningful human autonomy 
from the dictates of the market. 
Is the demand for UBI in China utopian? 
Perhaps. But based on the past two decades of 
experience, we know for a fact that collective 
bargaining is a chimera. As China’s wealth and 
social inequalities yawn ever wider, factories 
relocate to cheaper locales, automation 
expunges workers from the labour process, 
and the old state socialist institutions continue 
to rot in irrelevance, it is time to change tack. 
The death of collective bargaining may yet be 
a gift to China’s workers.
Eli Friedman
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In the People’s Republic of China the media, 
official state policies, and propaganda, as well 
as the policies of market organisations, define 
rural-to-urban migrants (nongmingong) as 
essentially lacking ‘human quality’ (suzhi). 
They are depicted as being poor, uncivilised, 
backwards, and hopelessly bound to their 
rural roots. In China, the nongmingong 
paradigm also evokes the spectre of Maoist 
egalitarianism. This implicitly reminds 
Chinese people that post-Mao inequality 
should be recognised as the motor of 
‘development’, and that it has allowed people 
to get rich or, to paraphrase Deng Xiaoping, it 
has allowed some to ‘get rich first’. Western 
media and academia have largely drawn on the 
paradigm of the rustic, plain, and hopelessly 
marginalised nongmingong, identifying them 
with a specifically Chinese ‘underclass’. As 
Michael Stewart has observed in his study 
of the plight of Romany people of Eastern 
Europe, the use of this term, however, may 
obscure more than it illuminates in terms of 
social exclusion, as it homogenises complex 
social realities.
Roberta Zavoretti
Rural-to-urban migrants in China are often 
depicted as being poor, uncivilised, and having 
a lower level of ‘human quality’ than those with 
urban household registration. Policy-makers 
carefully strategise in order to produce rural-
to-urban migrants as a homogeneous category. 
However, the use of this term obscures more 
than it illuminates, as it homogenises complex 
social realities.
Making Class 
and Place in 
Contemporary China
16
Migrant workers in Guangdong. 
Photo: CNY Hélène (Flickr)
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Displacements of Class 
Meanings
Since the 1990s, ethnographers have 
devoted much attention to the predicament 
of migrant factory workers in South China. 
Pun Ngai, for example, argues that this 
group constitutes a new working class whose 
subordinate position is determined by the 
interplay of ethnicity, gender, and residence 
status. These sensitive and influential 
ethnographies, however, portray the specific 
experiences of life and labour in Guangdong-
based factories, rather than providing a 
general picture of migrant labour in China. 
General depictions of China’s nongmingong 
as a socially homogeneous group are 
constantly confronted with the ever-growing 
heterogeneity and presence of migrants in 
the labour force. The phenomenon of labour 
migration in China involves people who 
differ by local origin, employment sector, 
income, educational level, gender, and age, to 
mention just a few factors. 
In present-day China, the state-sponsored 
discursive production of migrant labourers 
as a ‘real’ and homogeneous social group 
sustains the promotion of the hegemonic 
social model of an ideally emerging ‘middle 
class’. This trope implies high disposable 
income and home ownership, as well as 
publicly recognised professional status, 
top-level education and the highly valued 
quality of taste. In other words, it embodies 
the ability to compete and to choose as a 
high-quality consumer. Yet the discursive 
opposition between the nongmingong 
paradigm and the trope of middle classness 
must be produced without mentioning ‘class’ 
(jieji), a term that China-based policy, media, 
and academic production routinely avoid, and 
replace with the less conflictive term ‘social 
stratum’ (jieceng).  To quote Sherry Ortner, 
the use of the policy category of nongmingong 
contributes to the continuous ‘displacement 
of class meanings’ into other discursive fields, 
such as gender, geographical background, 
ethnicity, and sexuality, in order to produce 
a class-based order without mentioning class. 
Household Registration 
Today
The household registration (hukou) system 
has long allowed administrative institutions 
to identify rural-born city dwellers as a group. 
However, following the social and economic 
changes of the last forty years, as well as the 
various reforms of hukou at the local level, a 
debate has emerged about the link between 
residence status and the reproduction of social 
inequality. Following the radical Reform-
led changes in urban-based employment and 
social security provision, the hukou system 
is no longer used to stop rural residents 
from moving into the cities. Urban residence 
status is increasingly being commoditised 
through policies linked to the opening up of 
the housing and employment markets. Four 
decades of market-oriented policies have 
brought about a profound redefinition of 
social relations and a rapid process of social 
segmentation in the countryside as well as in 
the city. 
Some scholars have associated urban 
hukou status with the idea of ‘citizenship’, 
thus echoing a larger debate on migration, 
citizenship, and globalisation. This debate 
illuminates the dynamics of state-market 
relations at a global level, while being 
relevant to China as well. Saskia Sassen’s 
analysis of migrant service sector workers 
in ‘global cities’ distinguishes between a top 
end of high-flying ‘global managers’ and a 
bottom end of low-status service workers 
whose existence is the bedrock of the current 
global economic system. This latter group is 
denied full citizen rights and is therefore, by 
definition, vulnerable to exploitation and to 
specific forms of state policing. Notably, the 
state’s policing role survived the rolling back 
of nation-states prescribed by the current 
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neoliberal policy trend. The neoliberal state 
is thus not antagonistic to, but rather complicit 
with global market forces and transnational 
institutions. This synergy between state and 
market in neoliberal times implies an altered 
idea of the citizen as a self-regulating, self-
promoting competitor and consumer, and 
thereby a noticeable redefinition of the value 
of citizenship. In this view, Sassen ultimately 
suggest that citizenship may gradually lose 
importance in the lives of migrants due to 
the neoliberal restructuring of state-market 
relations.
Governing Inequalities
  
In post-Mao China the restructuring of 
state-market relations—and accordingly of 
the relationships of both state and market 
with citizens—brought about a specific form 
of governance that reconciles the state’s 
promotion of neoliberal subjectivities with the 
perpetuation of socialist discursive practices 
and political structures. The persistence of 
the household registration system allows 
state policy to cast hukou status—rather 
than class, for example—as a proxy for social 
positionality. While residence status still 
plays an important role in the definition of 
social positionality, however, urban residence 
is gradually ceasing to represent a guarantee 
of economic and social rights, as Solinger 
anticipated in her study of the work unit in 
the early 1990s. 
Following the gradual dismantlement of the 
work unit, the state has increasingly made 
access to resources and services not a matter 
of residence, but of individual responsibility 
towards the family. According to this model of 
governance, each individual should compete 
to secure jobs and invest sensibly in his/
her family’s long-term security, and also by 
participating in market-mediated insurance 
schemes. In this context, identifying ‘urban 
residence status’ with citizenship-based full 
civil, social and economic rights obscures the 
role that equally important variables play 
in the formation of social inequality, such as 
class, connections, gender, education, etc. 
18 MADE IN CHINA - CHINA COLUMNS
Migrant workers in Shanghai. 
Photo: Leniners (Flickr)
These assets may be far better guarantees in 
terms of securing social and economic rights, 
including the right to be recognised as an 
‘urban citizen’. 
Nongmingong as a 
Strategic Discourse
The development of China’s state-led 
capitalism and the dramatic increase of 
inequality witnessed in Chinese society has 
led to the emergence of unprecedented forms 
of social exclusion—even among the once 
protected urban residents. During the Maoist 
era, urban residence status guaranteed the 
provision of a large array of services, including 
employment and housing. The main channel 
for rural to urban mobility was supposed 
to be higher education. Rural youngsters, 
however, faced enormous challenges to get a 
formal education in their villages, and only 
few determined and lucky ones were able to 
access universities. Four decades of economic 
reforms fundamentally changed the nature of 
social inequality and the role that residence 
status plays in it. During the pre-reform era, 
holding urban residence enabled citizens 
to claim housing (although often of poor 
quality) from the state; nowadays it is the 
ability to purchase property on the housing 
market that allows many, if not all, to access 
urban residence. Purchasing housing is also a 
strategy to situate oneself in a highly unequal 
and segmented society. 
Local authorities throughout the country 
have been gradually reforming hukou-
related provisions, leading to a de facto 
commoditisation of residence. However, 
the nongmingong remain a central category 
in state policy and media discourse. Local 
policy-makers carefully strategise in order 
to produce and maintain the social order. 
Policies that produce rural-to-urban 
migrants as a homogeneous category remind 
urban residents that these ‘outsiders’ may 
constitute a social problem; they also prompt 
Roberta Zavoretti
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both rural and urban residents to see each 
other as competitors rather than as possible 
allies on the basis of overlapping socio-
economic positions. In addition, grouping 
citizens according to the rural/urban binary 
allows the state to deflect attention from 
the increasing complexity and deepening of 
inequality in the city as in the village.
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Fare Thee Well, 
Chinese Civil Society?
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Taru Salmenkari
Chinese civil society research is obsessed with 
finding non-governmental organisations. In 
this search, different types of civil society 
organisations are conflated, and non-
governmentality becomes the sole factor that 
matters. Analytical accuracy is lost when too 
many things are fused under one term, especially 
when more accurate and nuanced terminology is 
available.
Conceptual Confusion 
in the Research on 
Chinese Civil Society
Research on Chinese civil society is 
consumed with the obsession of finding non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). In this 
search, non-governmentality becomes the 
sole factor that matters in civil society. As a 
consequence, all civil society organisations 
and functions have been lumped together, 
perhaps with the expectation that any 
organisation that is non-governmental will 
be conducive to facilitating all the positives 
associated with civil society. This is evidence 
of conceptual confusion. Analytical accuracy 
is lost when too many things are fused under 
one term, especially when more accurate and 
nuanced terminology is available. In China 
studies, this conceptual bloating concerns 
both civil society organisations and civil 
society itself.
Organisational Categories
The field of China studies often conflates 
different types of civil society organisations. 
For instance, the term ‘NGO’ is used to refer 
to a wide range of organisations, regardless of 
whether they are political or not. Elsewhere, 
NGO is usually reserved for associations 
engaged in advocacy or participating in 
developmental projects. In particular, in 
the West NGOs constitute a self-proclaimed 
category used for advocacy and for demanding 
inclusion in policy-making processes. The 
category is not politically neutral, but mostly 
comes with a liberal or leftist worldview. 
Some other organisations, such as ‘think 
tanks’, often hold more rightist stances but 
may occasionally engage in activities similar 
to what NGOs do. In Japanese parlance, 
the term NGO is used to refer to those 
organisations engaged in developmental aid, 
while those that work on domestic arenas 
are usually called non-profit organisations 
(NPOs). 
Instead of NGO, a number of other terms are 
available for voluntary organisations engaging 
in societal service production and its private 
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funding. Others include NPOs, philanthropic 
organisations, charities, aid organisations, 
foundations, cooperatives, social enterprises, 
and self-help groups. ‘NPO’, in particular, 
is a legal category employed in relation 
to specific tax regulations reserved for 
voluntary associations. The official Chinese 
category—‘citizen-initiated non-enterprise 
units’ (minban feiqiye danwei)—conveys the 
same meaning. Because many civil society 
organisations are actually registered within 
this category, Chinese scholars, correctly, use 
‘NPO’ at least as often as ‘NGO’. In addition to 
NGOs and NPOs, civil societies are populated 
by other types of organisations such as 
interest groups, professional associations, 
sports clubs, support groups, academic 
societies, syndicates, cooperatives, and many 
others. 
Furthermore, civil society includes more 
fluid and less organised forms of associating. 
Civil societies contain social movements, 
campaign networks, community assemblies, 
voluntary projects, and temporary gatherings 
and forums inspired by public issues. 
These less formal platforms and networks 
are even closer to civil society ideals than 
formal associations are. Besides, the fall 
of communism in Eastern Europe and the 
Arab Spring demonstrated that these non-
organised or loosely organised forms of public 
activity have more potential than registered 
associations for mobilising social pressure 
for democratisation.  
Conceptual Mistakes
China studies would benefit from using 
more specific terms for different types of 
organisations because different organisations 
do dissimilar things and fulfil particular 
attributes of civil society in distinct ways. The 
use of the term ‘NGO’ for many analytically 
diverse types of organisations in society 
suggests that NGOs can do it all just by the 
virtue of their non-governmentality. 
‘NGOs’ are expected to defend interests, 
channel developmental aid, give voice to 
society, produce social services for the needy, 
protect rights, empower the marginalised, 
self-regulate industries, offer opportunities 
for popular participation, advocate liberal 
causes, and, eventually, demand a democratic 
political system. This list should make it 
evident that an individual NGO can hardly do 
everything and that some kind of division of 
labour is needed to fulfil these promises of 
civil society. This division of labour should 
be recognised and highlighted conceptually.
Conflating too many aspects together 
blurs analytical clarity and results in 
misinterpretations. Because terminology 
makes no distinctions between causes and 
roles in civil society, conclusions based on one 
specific type of civil society organisation have 
been expanded to cover them all. Conceptual 
confusion has contributed to consensus that 
Chinese NGOs are mainly service providers. 
Had service-providing organisations been 
classified as NPOs, attention could have been 
focused on political NGO activities as such. 
In fact, China is no exception. Nowhere in 
the world do advocacy NGOs make up the 
majority of civil society organisations. 
Currently, analytical approaches that suit 
one type of civil society organisation are 
expected to suit them all. It makes complete 
sense to analyse as an epistemic community 
a global advocacy network that produces 
and spreads new knowledge and vocabulary 
in order to make violence against women 
a political issue. Chinese feminist NGOs 
campaigning against domestic violence are 
part of this epistemic community. However, 
non-profit service providers hardly form 
such an epistemic community. 
Orally, I have heard my colleagues 
suggest even wilder ideas, such as using the 
One Foundation, a private philanthropic 
foundation, to discuss NGO advocacy, while 
still opining that there is no connection 
between charity and civil society. Using 
the term ‘NGO’ for all privately established 
associations makes it non-transparent when 
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they are philanthropic and when they engage 
in more political activities, such as policy 
advocacy and interest promotion.
This type of conceptual confusion has 
caused a major theoretical confusion in 
China studies. Only China studies uses the 
theory of corporatism about interest groups 
for analysing NGOs, as if all associations 
automatically equal intermediary 
organisations and interest groups. Those 
who introduced the term ‘corporatism’ to 
Chinese studies used it correctly to analyse 
labour union activities and business 
associations. Corporatism is a form of 
interest representation delegating regulatory 
functions to interest groups in civil society. 
Hence, it has been described as a mixed 
mode of policy-making, private interest 
government, and self-regulation. 
However, NGOs are not the kinds of 
organisations that could participate in 
corporatism. They do not represent any 
sector and cannot make agreements on behalf 
of a sector. Many NGOs have only a few 
members. Thus, they are not intermediary 
organisations able to talk to the state or other 
interest groups in the name of a coherent 
social group. Furthermore, corporatism does 
not contain a comprehensive vision about 
the regulation of civil society as a whole. 
Corporatist compacts regulate only the 
relevant parties, such as relations between 
the labour and the employers, usually under 
the auspices of the state. Apart from these 
interest groups, all corporatist countries have 
voluntary associations not connected to this 
system.
Consequences on the 
Macro Level
Different types of organisations fulfil the 
promise of civil society in different ways. 
NPOs by definition emphasise voluntariness; 
advocacy NGOs monitor the government and 
demand a more inclusive political system; 
the philanthropic sector solicits non-state 
resources for causes determined as being 
important by society; interest groups engage 
in social mediation of interests. All of these 
attributes and functions are characteristics 
or forms of self-organising in society.
Using different terms for various 
organisations in civil society, and even for 
diverse visions of civil society, is advisable 
because these differentiated terms imply 
different relations to the state. Liberals see 
that advocacy NGOs offer policy alternatives 
in the public sphere. In more leftist 
interpretations, NGOs and social movements 
epitomise anti-hegemonic organising 
to demand inclusion and voice for the 
marginalised. Special-interest groups, which 
derive from the theory of pluralism rather 
than of civil society, lobby the government. 
In corporatism, certain intermediary groups 
participate in social mediation of interests in 
civil society, nowadays often through tripartite 
arrangements involving the state. Non-profit 
service production is present in most societies, 
but is theoretically emphasised in the 
neoliberal strategy for the state to reduce its 
social service burden by outsourcing services 
to civil society. Communitarianism wants to 
reclaim face-to-face social life and cultivate 
social capital in everyday life. For acquiring 
social capital, any form of association that 
brings people together is fine, recreational 
associations and self-help groups included. 
In the communitarian vision, associational 
life is a school for citizenship and political 
participation. Theoretically speaking, none 
of these relationships equal categorical 
separation from the state.
Civil society itself is a vast container of 
associative activities and ‘occasional’ and 
‘episodic publics’, which together constitute 
public life. As a whole, it seldom promotes 
any particular political opinion, supports 
any particular form of activity, or holds any 
united stance in regards to the government. 
In civil society, hegemonic groups associate 
alongside with anti-hegemonic forces. 
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Due to different contributions to civil 
society by different types of associations, 
just to show that civil society is there tells 
us little about what is happening within civil 
society or the political consequences of what 
is occurring. The developments are neither 
linear nor similar to associations of all 
types. For example, after the crushing of the 
massive protests in Beijing in 1989, the first 
independent aid organisations rocketed to 
fame, according to their own understanding 
because the state media needed positive news 
in gloomy times. Developments in different 
fields and between different types of civil 
society organisations can be contradictory. 
For example, some Chinese advocacy NGOs I 
have interviewed find that the opportunities 
emerging with the growth of the third sector 
contradict activists’ own ideals about NGO 
work.
Using Correct Terminology
Conceptual confusion in naming 
organisations leads to a poor understanding 
of civil society itself. The use of more accurate 
terms is not only beneficial for semantic 
clarity, but makes visible the unevenness of 
forces and growth trends within civil society. 
Hence, it may be advisable to use more 
confined terms which focus on some aspects 
of civil society only. ‘Associational society’ 
suffices if the purpose is to research formal 
associational activity without complex 
networks and causes that make these 
associations, ideally, contribute to national-
level publics and to a community of citizens. 
Other terms used far too little in China 
studies are ‘third sector’, or its equivalents, 
‘non-profit sector’ and ‘voluntary sector’. 
This omission is particularly surprising 
considering the fast development of this 
sector in China. Not only would analytical 
nuance be gained if third sector service 
production was distinguished from political 
aspects of civil society, but using these terms 
would treat China more equally than current 
civil society research does. Although Chinese 
associations are not always fully ‘autonomous’ 
(whatever that means), the existence of three 
separate sectors is evident. China observably 
has a public sector, a private sector, and a 
third sector. 
Conceptual clarity is needed to understand 
what happens in Chinese civil society. 
Consequences are hardly the same if the 
number of political advocacy groups or the 
number of third sector service providers 
grows. These types of organisations answer 
to very different social needs, have different 
relations to the government, and contribute 
differently to politics and democratisation. 
One part of civil society can be growing even 
if others are not or even if its growth happens 
at the expense of another part. 
For gaining a more comprehensive, nuanced 
and meaningful understanding about Chinese 
civil society, researchers should do what 
social sciences have always taught them to 
do: use accurate and exact terminology to 
specify what is being referred to and what is 
expected of the research objects.
Taru Salmenkari
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The passage of the Charity Law in May 2016 
has made the legal environment for charities 
in China more complex. The new Law does 
represent an initial breakthrough in the 
transformation of the regulatory system for 
social organising and, on a deeper level, in the 
relations between society, government, Party, 
and market. However, it does not equalise the 
rules for all Chinese non-profit organisations 
and, crucially, it does not provide a basic social 
organisation law applicable to all types of non-
profit entities. Why does this matter?
China’s Social 
Organisations after 
the Charity Law
Many commentators have sought to 
simplify the legal environment in China after 
the passage of the Charity Law in May 2016. 
But in our view that Law has made the legal 
environment more complex. The new Law 
does represent an initial breakthrough in the 
transformation of the regulatory system for 
social organising, and on a deeper level in the 
relations between society, government, Party, 
and market. However, it does not equalise the 
rules for all Chinese non-profit organisations 
(NPOs), and crucially it does not provide a 
basic social organisation law applicable to all 
types of non-profit entities. But why does this 
matter?
What is a Social 
Organisation?
To understand the need for a basic law 
for social organisations, first we need to get 
straight what social organisations are, and 
what charitable organisations are not. ‘Social 
organisation’ (shehui zuzhi) (hereafter SO) 
can be understood as a kind of blanket term 
used in official policy for all kinds of non-
governmental NPOs. It covers the three legal 
forms that Chinese citizens are obliged to 
choose from to establish such an organisation: 
Cishan Fa, the new Charity Law passed in May 2016. 
Photo: Canyu.org
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foundations (jijinhui), social groups (shehui 
tuanti), and social service organisations 
(shehui fuwu jigou). At present, it also covers 
citizen-initiated non-enterprise units (widely 
known by their abbreviated Chinese name 
‘minfei’) (minban feiqiye danwei). The latter 
continues to be a legal form even though the 
Charity Law and the newly modified General 
Provisions of Civil Law (GPCL), passed by 
the NPC on 15 March 2017, replace it with 
‘social service organisations’. There are 
currently over three hundred and twenty 
thousand minfei already with legal status that 
have been placed in limbo since the passing 
of the Charity Law. This is partly because 
the relevant administrative regulations are 
currently being revised—the latest draft 
of the new minfei regulations was released 
publically in May-June 2016 to solicit 
comments, but revisions have been ongoing 
for years and there is uncertainty as to when 
and what revisions will be made. 
The term ‘SO’ also covers a new category—
‘charitable organisation’ (cishan zuzhi)—
created by the Charity Law. While the new 
GPCL makes the watershed adjustment of 
dividing legal persons into ‘non-profit’ and 
‘for-profit’, charitable organisations are not 
among the four categories of organisations 
referred to as NPOs. ‘Charitable organisation’ 
does not represent a legal category in its 
own right. Instead it can be thought of as 
being a hallmark of an SO’s ability to adhere 
to legal requirements related to accounting, 
transparency, and so on. To become a 
charitable organisation, a group must register 
as one of the legal forms of non-profit SOs, 
then apply for charitable accreditation. In 
other words, if we tier the new system (‘new’ 
after the GPCL), the GPCL is the threshold 
system, a basic law on SOs would be the 
second tier (this does not yet exist), and the 
Charity Law would be the third tier.
The GPCL treats public service institutions 
(shiye danwei), foundations, social groups, 
and social service organisations as NPOs. 
The first of these, public service institutions, 
differ significantly from the others. They are 
not SOs, although it is intended that some 
will morph into them. Born of the socialist 
system built after the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China, public service 
institutions formed the public service arm 
of the government structure that all but 
subsumed society. With their deep links to 
government and their ability to monopolise 
resources and opportunities, their reform is 
essential to creating a competitive non-profit 
market in which diverse and genuinely non-
governmental organisations can thrive.  
China’s SOs work in education, healthcare, 
culture, science and technology, and sports 
and fitness, which are among the many fields 
covered explicitly in the broad definition of 
charity used in the Charity Law. But they also 
work in a vast range of other areas, on labour 
issues, in advocacy, legal services, and so on, 
none of which are covered by the Charity 
Law. While legislators and scholars involved 
in the legislative process for the Charity Law 
underlined the ‘big ’ definition of charity 
as a legislative success and an important 
fundamental feature of the Law, many SOs 
cannot be squeezed into the definition of 
charitable organisations, no matter how ‘big ’ 
that definition may be.
In implementation, while the Charity Law 
offers the opportunity to gain charitable 
status through accreditation to SOs that do 
fit its definition, there is already anecdotal 
evidence of SO leaders being reluctant to seek 
this charitable status for their organisations. 
Thus, for myriad SOs, there is a gaping 
legislative hole. 
Breaking Down the Old 
System of SO Regulation
There is no doubt that the Charity Law is a 
landmark step toward breaking down the old 
system for regulating social organising. That 
system was characterised by a lack of clear 
boundaries between society, state, and the 
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market, and the use of administrative powers 
to meddle in and control SOs combined 
with a failure to regulate effectively. At 
the Eighteenth National Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012, it 
was announced that China was to build ‘an 
SO system in which government and SOs are 
separate, powers and obligations are clear, 
and autonomy is practiced in accordance 
with law.’ This is a powerful statement of 
intent, which has often been quoted in the 
Chinese literature to suggest that SOs will 
gain greater autonomy and be freed from 
government intervention. The Charity Law, 
if implemented fully, is a significant move in 
this direction, to a certain extent delineating 
boundaries and replacing administrative 
control with law-based regulation. In this 
sense, it is an important step in building a 
new model of governance. 
The Charity Law moves toward direct 
registration for some SOs in a step that is 
basically a nationwide adoption of rules that 
had already been put into practice in a large 
number of provinces. It moves away from ex 
ante regulation to a system of ex post oversight 
connected to report filing, transparency, 
and accountability—placing new demands 
on organisations in these regards. These 
responsibilities do not come accompanied 
automatically with new rights. The Charity 
Law and its ancillary regulations make the 
right to fundraise from the public a possibility 
for SOs that gain charitable organisation 
status, albeit only through a further process 
of accreditation. This is a major step in 
levelling the playing field for some genuinely 
non-governmental organisations to compete 
in the non-profit market. 
The new Law begins to swap opaque 
administrative management for a greater 
reliance on public oversight, and new ways 
of making this possible, such as with analysis 
of big data. There continue, however, to be 
exceptions and strong traces of the old way 
of thinking about how to achieve regulation. 
This is apparent for example in the 
Provisional Regulations on the Work of SO 
Registration and Management Bodies Related 
to Administrative Law Enforcement Using 
Talks (yuetan) released days after the passage 
of the Charity Law. Also, interestingly, some 
of the ancillary regulations that followed the 
passage of the Charity Law are actually related 
to all SOs and not just those with charitable 
organisation status, such as the Provisional 
Measures on SO Registration and Management 
Bodies’ Receipt and Handling of Complaints 
and Accusations passed in August 2016, and 
the Guiding Opinion on Strengthening and 
Improving the Management of Pay in SOs 
issued in July of the same year. This shows 
the need to regulate all SOs and not just 
charitable organisations.
Building a New System of 
Governance  
The Charity Law goes further toward 
enabling SOs to provide public services to 
the Chinese people in lieu of government. 
This means that government must delegate 
and outsource service provision through 
instruments set up at the local level. Some 
provinces and municipalities will find it more 
comfortable to do this by contracts or grants, 
while others may wish to use vouchers, and 
other methods.
Allowing SOs to provide almost everything 
but the most basic of public services forms one 
part of the transformation of China’s system 
of governance. Back in 2013, the Resolution 
of the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth 
Central Committee of the CCP announced 
that the ‘overall aim of comprehensively 
deepening reform is to push ahead with the 
modernisation of China’s governance system 
and capacity for governance.’ But using law as 
a means to do this will only go so far unless 
the law itself goes further. A basic law for 
charities is not enough.    
Two areas of reform given attention in 
Premier Li Keqiang’s 2017 Government 
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Work Report illustrate this well. The first 
is the ‘profound reform of government’ as 
government steps up efforts to transform 
its own functions and delegate roles and 
powers to others. SOs, not just charitable 
organisations, are a key group to ‘receive’ 
these new roles and powers. A crucial 
top level policy document issued jointly 
in 2016 by the general offices of the CCP 
Central Committee and the State Council—
an unprecedentedly high level document for 
the non-profit sector—links the government’s 
transformation of functions directly to SO 
development. The ‘Two-Office Opinion’ 
(liangban yijian) as this document is known 
in Chinese, tells us that government will give 
priority to SOs in purchasing services related 
to safeguarding people’s welfare, social 
governance, and industry regulation, and 
states the need for SOs to make innovations 
in social governance. 
The second, directly related to the first, 
is the continued reform of public service 
institutions, the so-called shiye danwei. 
This reform goes back many years, but was 
underlined early in Xi Jinping’s first term in 
office as an important task in transforming 
the functions of government. Looking back at 
the Resolution of the Third Plenary Session 
of the Eighteenth Central Committee, the 
stated intention was to ‘push publically run 
public service institutions to clear up their 
relationships with their managing bodies and 
de-governmentalise (qu xingzhenghua)’ and 
‘push those public service institutions in the 
position to do so to transform into enterprises 
or SOs.’ 
What kind of SOs are these public service 
institutions supposed to transform into? 
Surely they cannot all be transformed into 
charities? And yet there is no basic law for SOs. 
This is not an easy issue as these institutions 
have complicated relationships with the state, 
involving a tangled web of different interests. 
Perhaps an even more knotty issue is that of 
the mass organisations (renmin tuanti), such 
as the All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
and the All-China Women’s Federation. But, 
these are critical reforms. In the market, 
state-owned enterprise reform is needed to 
level the playing field for businesses. In the 
third sector, public service institution reform 
is needed to allow the fair competition 
necessary to develop healthy SOs able to 
take on the roles and responsibilities of a 
transforming and downsizing government.   
Our perspectives on this issue will be 
expanded on in other papers we intend 
to publish, the first of which will be in the 
Nonprofit Policy Forum this summer. Trying 
to get to grips with this vast area entails time 
and attention. And there is much that is new, 
such as the GPCL, which goes into effect on 1 
October 2017.
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Over the past decade, the not-for-profit 
foundation sector has grown rapidly in China. 
This expansion has occurred as international 
foundations and organisations were 
withdrawing funding from Chinese grassroots 
NGOs, causing many civil society leaders to 
put their hopes into domestic foundations as a 
way to close their deficit of funding. But can the 
rise of foundations in China really replace the 
evaporating foreign grants for domestic NGOs?
The Rise of 
Foundations: Hope 
for Grassroots Civil 
Society in China?
After the new Regulations on 
Administration of Foundations were 
promulgated in 2004, foundations (jijinhui)—
that is not-for-profit organisations that 
promote public benefit undertakings through 
grants and donations—experienced rapid 
growth in China. In light of this, some 
observers considered private foundations 
to be the hope of China’s third sector. The 
rapid expansion of the foundation sector 
indeed occurred as international foundations 
and organisations were withdrawing funding 
from Chinese grassroots NGOs, and many 
civil society leaders hoped that foundations 
would replace the international funding 
deficit. According to a report by the China 
Development Brief, ‘NGOs cannot rely 
solely on international foundations. In the 
future, international foundations will move 
on to other countries. Even now you see 
international foundations will not use the 
majority of their funding on a country like 
China that is developing so fast.’ In fact, the 
Global Fund withdrew funding from China 
in 2013, the Ford Foundation changed its 
funding profile so that less than one third of 
its funding went to grassroots NGOs, and the 
new Foreign NGOs Management Law passed 
in 2016 restricts foreign funding of domestic 
social organisations. In this essay, I explore 
whether the rise of foundations in China 
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could serve as a potential funding source to 
replace foreign grants for domestic NGOs.
Despite the promise of the rise of Chinese 
foundations, I find that they function 
differently from their counterparts in the 
United States, in that very few foundations 
make grants to other non-profit organisations. 
This might be a result of differences in the 
identity (or missions) of Chinese foundations, 
or simply due to their relatively early stage 
of development. Regardless of the reason, 
since foundations mostly finance their 
own projects rather than funding other 
organisations, they often compete with, 
rather than support, NGOs. If this trend 
continues after the implementation of the 
Foreign NGOs Management Law further 
restricts foreign funding, grassroots NGOs 
will depend entirely on private donations 
and government-awarded service contracts 
for funding. Government contracts do not 
help grassroots NGOs build capacity in the 
same way that grants often do, in that most 
contracts prohibit the use of funding for 
salaries or restrict other administrative costs 
to ten percent of the total value of the contract. 
In order to promote a more diverse and active 
civil society sector, foundations in China 
should partner more with grassroots NGOs 
to build civil-society capacity and replace 
lost international funding. For example, the 
Narada Foundation provided ten million yuan 
to NGOs for over sixty-two projects related 
to disaster relief and to aid reconstruction 
after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. This 
undoubtedly had a large impact on the groups 
receiving funding, and arguably helped them 
build capacity. 
The Rise of the 
Foundations Sector in 
China
Although the first foundations were 
established in 1981, the rapid expansion of 
this sector did not occur until after the 2004 
Regulations were passed, reducing capital 
barriers to two million yuan. The earliest 
were public foundations, mostly funded and 
managed by the government, and the 2004 
Regulations distinguish between ‘public 
fundraising foundations’ (gongmu jijinhui) 
which are allowed to raise funds publicly, 
and non-public fundraising foundations 
(feigongmu jijinhui), which are not allowed to 
raise funds publicly. Before 2004, over eighty 
percent of all foundations were government-
initiated public foundations; but after 2004, 
private foundations increased to forty 
percent. Although private citizens started 
some of these private foundations, many 
are established by companies, especially 
those in real estate. In 2010, the number of 
private foundations overtook public ones, 
and by 2013 the total number of foundations 
reached 3,082—1,753 private and 1,329 public. 
At the latest count, 5,209 foundations were 
registered in China. Education is their most 
common focus, with fifty-three percent of 
all foundations focusing on education as a 
key area. By 2013, there were 422 education 
foundations, with net assets, income and 
charitable spending accounting for nearly half 
of the total spending of private foundations. 
Why is the emergence of a foundation 
sector so important? According to Joel 
Fleishman, in the United States, foundations 
represent ‘the operational secret of America’s 
civic sector’ by playing ‘the priming role … 
in starting new civic–sector organisations, 
they nurture them into self-sustainability, 
and provide a continuous supply of social 
venture capital to the civic sector.’ While 
almost eighty percent of the foundations in 
the United States are grant-making, private 
Chinese foundations mostly operate their 
own projects; one study found that only 1.6 
percent of all public foundations and 13.2 
percent of all private foundations could be 
categorised as grant-making. Thus, despite 
the promise of private foundations becoming 
‘the hope of China’s third sector’, very few 
foundations currently make grants to other 
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non-profit organisations: 43.5 percent provide 
some grants to grassroots organisations, 
but only nine percent are solely grant-
making foundations. As Xu Yongguang, 
the President of the Narada Foundation and 
Emeritus Chairman of the China Foundation 
Center, notes, private foundations that fund 
NGOs are still in the minority. This results in 
insufficient support for grassroots NGOs—a 
situation that will take time to change. 
Despite its growing number of wealthy 
citizens, China has also been criticised for 
having little charitable giving. For example, 
the 2015 ‘World Giving Index’ ranked China 
144 out of 145. Furthermore, while many 
foundations have been established, indicating 
the potential for an expanded charity sector, 
the China Foundation Ranking—a survey of 
grassroots Chinese NGOs that looks at their 
experiences with funders—criticised these 
organisations for not engaging in promoting 
the development of the sector or supporting 
the work of local NGOs. In the words of Chen 
Yimei, the Executive Director of the China 
Development Brief, ‘[the China Foundation 
Ranking] helps to make foundations realize 
that they should treat NGOs with more 
equality in their partnerships, rather than 
just assume a top-down relationship…. It’s 
a critical moment, a time when foundations 
are thinking about their operating model and 
the philanthropy sector is contemplating 
whether we should have more grant-making 
foundations.’ 
Sources of Change?
The lack of NGO support on the part of 
Chinese foundations might be due to a number 
of reasons, including legal impediments, 
habits of donors and foundations, or just an 
early stage of development. For example, over 
eighty-five percent of foundations have been 
registered with low levels of initial capital, 
under eight million yuan. As regulations 
and habits change, will we see that more 
Chinese foundations assume a grant-making 
role, similar to the foundations in the United 
States? Or, as these foundations continue 
to develop, will we see persistence along a 
unique path of development, i.e. ‘foundations 
with Chinese characteristics’?
Regarding legal impediments, there is 
a great deal of change in the regulations 
governing this sector. The 2004 Regulations 
promoted the expansion of the foundation 
sector due to changes in tax laws, as well as 
the formation of private foundations. More 
recently, the 2016 Foreign NGOs Law restricts 
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the ability of international foundations to 
fund grassroots NGOs in China. This means 
that Chinese NGOs will need to depend more 
on domestic sources of funding. In addition 
to increasing services contracted by local 
governments, the 2016 Charity Law allows 
any registered charity to apply for permission 
to seek public donations (see also the article 
by Simon and Snape in the present issue of 
Made in China). This major change might 
provide more funding sources for NGOs, in 
addition to funding from foundations which, 
Shawn Shieh notes, is slowly increasing 
through mechanisms like ‘special funds’ and 
‘joint fundraising’. The regulations governing 
registration and management of the three 
types of ‘social organisations’ (shehui 
zuzhi) are currently under revision, and 
amendments are expected to be issued related 
to the Regulations on the Registration and 
Administration of Social Associations (1998); 
the Interim Regulations on the Registration 
and Administration of Civil Non-Enterprise 
Institutions (1998); and the Regulations on 
the Management of Foundations (2004). 
In addition to legal changes that seem 
to encourage philanthropic giving and the 
expansion of the foundation sector, there 
is also a shift in habits of both donors and 
foundations regarding willingness to fund 
NGOs. This began in 2008 after the Sichuan 
earthquake. In 2016 the top one hundred 
Chinese philanthropists donated 37.9 billion 
yuan, up nearly twenty-five percent from 
the record 30.4 billion yuan given in 2014, 
underscoring the philanthropic potential 
in China. Since, as Xu Yongguang notes, 
public foundations control most of the public 
donations in China, it may be more important 
to convince these types of foundations to 
support NGOs, as when the Chinese Red Cross 
offered funding to grassroots NGOs for the 
first time in the wake of the 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake. Xu and other foundation leaders 
are also creating initiatives like the China 
Private Foundation Forum and the China 
Foundation Center to encourage greater 
cooperation between foundations and NGOs.
These changes in the laws supporting 
foundations and philanthropy, shifting norms 
around charitable giving, coupled with the 
continued development of the foundation 
sector in China, might encourage foundations 
to take on more of a grant-making role similar 
to foundations in the United States. However, 
becoming a grant-maker is not inevitable, 
and is instead a decision that the founder 
must make. In this way, the unique path of 
development for Chinese foundations might 
influence whether foundations choose a grant-
making mission over a project-based one.  As 
Shawn Shieh contends, ‘In our interviews, 
a surprising number of foundations who did 
commit to grant-making did so either because 
their founders had participated in or were 
in some way influenced by international 
philanthropic approaches.’ If the American 
model of grant-making influences the 
development of Chinese foundations, this 
would provide an invaluable source of 
funding for Chinese NGOs, especially as 
these grants might allow for a stronger focus 
on capacity building, unlike government 
service contracts. Although there remain 
many obstacles, the collaboration between an 
increasingly vigorous foundation sector and 
Chinese NGOs would thus end up reinforcing 
the continued development of each.
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Chinese labour NGOs have to deal with 
several state bodies. When they are properly 
registered as social organisations, they fall 
under the supervision of the departments of 
civil affairs; in carrying out activities among 
workers they often find themselves face to 
face with the police; in addressing workers’ 
grievances they communicate with labour 
offices. Still, given their reliance on foreign 
funding and the political sensitivity of labour 
issues in China, the agency they have the most 
dealings with is probably the State Security 
(guobao), a secretive branch of the public 
Ivan Franceschini
Chinese labour NGOs have to deal with several 
state bodies. Still, given their reliance on 
foreign funding and the political sensitivity of 
labour issues in China, the agency they have the 
most dealings with is probably State Security, 
a secretive branch of the public security 
apparatus charged with protecting the country 
from domestic political threats. How do labour 
activists manage to navigate this challenging 
terrain?
O’Brien was a person who could be talked to. 
Perhaps one did not want to be loved so much 
as to be understood. O’Brien had tortured him 
to the edge of lunacy, and in a little while, it 
was certain, he would send him to his death. 
It made no difference. In some sense that went 
deeper than friendship, they were intimates: 
somewhere or other, although the actual words 
might never be spoken, there was a place where 
they could meet and talk.
George Orwell, 1984
A slightly different version of this essay will appear 
in Jane Golley and Luigi Tomba (eds.), China Story 
Yearbook 2016: Control, ANU Press, Canberra, 2017 
(forthcoming).
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Meet the State 
Security:
Chinese Labour 
Activists and Their 
Controllers
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security apparatus charged with protecting 
the country from domestic political threats.
I still remember my first meeting with an 
agent of the State Security. It was back in 
December 2010 and I had gone to the office 
of a relatively little-known labour NGO in 
the suburbs of Shenzhen to interview some 
activist there. When I arrived, I found a plump, 
bespectacled man of around forty waiting for 
me. Nobody thought about introducing him 
and he definitely did not make an effort to 
make himself familiar: for me, he was only 
‘Mister Wang’. Sitting in silence in a corner, 
he wrote down everything I was saying in 
a notebook. He was a very destabilising 
presence. Not only did I not know what I 
should say and what I should avoid, but I was 
also worried about the potential problems 
that I was causing for my hosts. 
My second brush with the State Security 
came some time later, and it was much more 
worrying. While I was back in Italy for a 
few weeks, some guobao officials tracked 
down one of my former collaborators and 
interrogated him at length about my activities 
and whereabouts. I heard much later that 
they were particularly interested in how I 
spent money: did I often rent expensive cars? 
Did I throw money around? He protested 
that I was so stingy that I always insisted on 
taking a bus even when doing interviews in 
some faraway suburb—which was true—and 
the matter seemed to rest there. In fact, being 
a foreigner, I had little reason to fear the 
consequences of these encounters: at worst, 
they would deny me a visa, or expel me from 
the country. But that encounter made me 
wonder about those Chinese labour activists 
who have to deal with the security forces of 
the Chinese state on a regular basis. How do 
they navigate this challenging terrain and 
manage their affairs?
As with other civil society activists, 
invitations to ‘have a cup of tea’ (he cha) with 
State Security officials are one of the most 
common occurrences in the life of a Chinese 
labour activist. These encounters generally 
do not entail physical violence, as they serve 
a twofold purpose. On the one hand, officials 
seek information about the activities of 
labour NGOs—such as recent contacts with 
foreigners and any new sources of funding. 
On the other, they use the meetings to warn, 
inform or remind activists about boundaries 
that they must not cross if they want to 
avoid severe repercussions. From this point 
of view, these gatherings can be considered 
mutually beneficial: the Chinese party-state 
gets to remind labour activists that they are 
under surveillance, while activists benefit 
from a direct line to the authorities and are 
able to avoid unnecessary risks. For instance, 
a labour activist in East China told me that 
when he set up his organisation ‘[the people 
from the State Security] came to me several 
times. First, they established a base line 
(dixian) and a framework (kuangjia), warning 
me to stay within these boundaries. They 
said that if I did that, all would be good, that 
I would even be helping the government and 
the country. If, on the contrary, I crossed that 
line, for instance by telling foreigners some 
things that I shouldn’t say about our country 
or our government… that would have meant 
real trouble.’ 
Still, promises are occasionally broken 
and these encounters do not always go so 
smoothly. The highest echelons of the party-
state tend to consider labour NGOs to be 
covert agents of ‘hostile foreign forces’ eager 
to wreak havoc in China, a narrative that has 
gained much more currency under Xi Jinping. 
Agents of the State Security may also resort to 
psychological intimidation and other tactics 
to persuade labour activists to cease their 
work. In the past few years, guobao officials 
have repeatedly pressured landlords to evict 
NGOs from their premises. They have also 
liaised with other branches of the party-
state—such as those in charge of family 
Sticks...
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planning, tax or social security bureaus, 
as well as universities, etc.—to harass the 
activists and their families. They have even 
intervened behind the scenes to freeze bank 
accounts or prevent people from leaving the 
country. As an activist in southern China 
told me in November 2014: ‘In the past, they 
didn’t provoke us, nor did we provoke them. 
Basically, what we had back then could not 
even be called repression. Usually, they just 
knew about the existence of our organisation 
and there were often people from the 
government who came to talk with us…. But 
these last few years have been quite different, 
they have started to harass us directly.’
While life for Chinese labour activists has 
never been easy, 2016 has been a horrible year 
for Chinese labour NGOs. As regular readers of 
Made in China will surely know, the latest wave 
of repression started in December 2015, when 
the Chinese authorities rounded up dozens 
of labour activists in Guangdong and then 
charged five of them for ‘gathering a crowd 
to disrupt public order’ and ‘embezzlement’. 
This coincided with a particularly difficult 
time for Chinese civil society, with the closure 
of many NGOs working on social issues and 
the arrest or outright disappearance of several 
public interest lawyers. On that occasion, the 
party-state singled out Zeng Feiyang, leader 
of a pioneering labour NGO in Guangzhou, 
targeting him in an unprecedented campaign 
to smear his reputation in the national media. 
A series of devastating reports accused Zeng 
of embezzling funding illegally obtained 
from foreigners and of acting out of personal 
greed, without any regard for the actual 
interests of the workers. To further destroy 
his credibility, he was also accused of several 
instances of sexual misconduct. 
Zeng pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 
three years of imprisonment—suspended for 
four years—for ‘gathering a crowd to disrupt 
public order’, while two of his colleagues 
received prison sentences of eighteen 
months—suspended for two years—for the 
same crime. Meng Han, another activist in the 
same organisation, refused to cooperate. Only 
after the repeated harassment of his parents, 
did he finally capitulate and plead guilty, 
and was sentenced to twenty-one months 
in jail. Zeng’s admission of guilt at the trial 
was quoted in full by the Chinese media: ‘I 
apologise for the losses that my criminal 
actions have caused to companies, society, 
and workers, and I express deep sorrow for 
the enormous wounds that I have inflicted on 
my family. I hope that everybody will take me 
as a warning and that they will not be fooled 
by any foreign organisation, [keeping in mind] 
that they must resort to legal means and 
channels to protect their rights and interests.’ 
The relationship between labour activists 
and their controllers is not always so thorny. 
I still remember my surprise when, about five 
years ago, an activist I used to know quite 
well told me that while he was recovering 
from surgery, the State Security official in 
charge of his surveillance had visited him in 
the hospital. Wishing him a speedy recovery, 
the guobao had brought flowers and they 
had engaged in amicable conversation. The 
activist explained that, since this official had 
been his ‘supervisor’ for quite some time, 
they had almost become friends, regularly 
exchanging greetings and wishes on all major 
Chinese festivals. 
Such ambiguous feelings are not so 
surprising considering that some activists 
are supervised by the same officials for years. 
These relationships may also offer some 
perks. As one activist in southern China 
recently told me: ‘We can say that they are 
old acquaintances… On the surface they are 
friendly, but in fact we don’t really know 
what they think about us, we just tell them 
what we have to… Sometimes they also offer 
us some gifts [like shopping coupons], which 
obviously we don’t accept… But it seems that 
in recent years they have become poorer, they 
...and Carrots
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don’t have as much money as before.’
In some cases, less scrupulous activists 
have exploited their connections to the State 
Security as leverage in their relationship 
with foreign donors. In 2009 and 2010, I 
was working as a manager on a project in 
partnership with a local labour NGO that 
turned out to be quite notorious for its 
record of fake activities and inflated invoices. 
When I refused to reimburse an obviously 
dodgy expenditure, the leader of the NGO 
hinted that he would say something rather 
unpleasant about me in his next meeting 
with the authorities. On another occasion, 
someone who had been fired from the same 
organisation decided to seek compensation 
directly from the foreign donor, threatening 
to talk with his ‘friends’ in the security 
apparatus if he did not get what he wanted.
Control over NGOs is increasing, and so 
is repression, and this extends to foreigners 
who are involved with them. In the past 
couple of years, a few expats in China with 
ties to foreign and local NGOs have been 
detained, with one of them—Peter Dahlin, 
a Swedish citizen—even being paraded on 
national television in early 2016 to confess to 
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What next?
inciting ‘opposition to the government’. But it 
is Chinese activists who bear the brunt of the 
ire of the party-state. Labour activists, as well 
as human rights lawyers, are among those 
most at risk in the current political climate. 
Even more worrying than brutal repression is 
the recent adoption of a whole series of new 
laws and regulations aimed at bringing civil 
society under control. Most notably among 
these is the new Foreign NGOs Law, effective 
from 1 January 2017, which basically cuts off 
any access to financial support from abroad 
for NGOs active in sensitive fields. 
Almost all the labour activists that I have 
encountered in the past few months say 
that they are willing to keep up the fight, 
undeterred. At the same time, however, they 
cannot help but wonder how they will be 
able to survive as their sources of financial 
support quickly dry up, and even finding 
enough money to pay their staff or the rent 
has become problematic. A few months ago, 
for the first time in many years of regular 
encounters with labour activists, I was asked 
by the leader of a once-prominent NGO now in 
serious financial troubles to help by sending 
some funding—‘really, any amount counts’—
to an account opened under the name of 
one of his friends. If this is going to be the 
‘new normal’ under Xi Jinping’s tenure, then 
activists might start reminiscing about the 
golden age when the most that State Security 
did was to invite you for a cup of tea.
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Peter Dahlin, a Swedish citizen, confessing to 
inciting opposition to the government on the 
Chinese national television.
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Børge Bakken
Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, the Chinese 
Communist Party has reinvigorated attempts to 
eradicate detrimental ‘Western ideas’, resulting 
in the assertion that civil society is nothing more 
than a concept, if not a trap set by the West. In 
practice, however, these attempts by the Chinese 
government to prevent a civil society from 
organising itself has led to the emergence of a 
very different—uncivil—type of society.
Snapshots of China’s 
‘Uncivil Society’
It has now been thirty years since former 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
gave voice to her famous and equally 
senseless idea that: ‘There is no such thing 
as society.’ In the Chinese Communist Party’s 
quest to eradicate ‘Western ideas’ from the 
realm of discourse in China through the 
‘seven prohibitions’ (qi bu jiang), Xi Jinping 
is likewise denying the existence of a society, 
by arguing that a civil society is nothing but 
a mere concept, and even a trap set by the 
West. Thatcher and Xi’s ideas are equally 
senseless and equally ideological in their 
quest to deny the obvious. While the denial of 
the very existence of a civil society is not new 
in China, and Xi Jinping is not the first to 
have devised this type of propaganda (it was 
already referred to as a ‘trap’ by the former 
Hu Jintao administration), the ‘trap theory’ 
today is closely linked to the propaganda 
surrounding the ‘Chinese Dream’ (zhongguo 
meng). 
Dreams of Exclusion
In the myth of the American Dream, it was 
once said that: ‘What is good for General 
Motors is good for America and good for you.’ 
In February 2013, The People’s Daily made a 
direct reference to the American Dream when 
stating that the Chinese Dream promotes the 
concept that ‘what is good for the country 
will be good for individuals.’ While holding 
to the assumption that the Chinese Dream 
diverges from its American counterpart, the 
party-state basically promoted the same myth 
about the dream’s alleged benefits for ‘the 
people’. 
Ideological references to ‘individualism’ 
and ‘collectivism’ aside, the respective 
‘Dreams’ are, of course, the dreams of the 
rich and the beautiful. Like in America, 
many Chinese fall outside the dream with no 
chance to ‘get rich first’, as was the original 
slogan put forward by Deng Xiaoping. The 
present propaganda texts emphasise that the 
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Chinese Dream is the dream of all Chinese, 
in particular the ‘Dream of the laobaixing’—
the ‘old one hundred surnames’, or the people 
themselves. Of course it is all basically an 
emperor’s dream, and very much as is the 
case in America, the people who fall outside 
the grand dream tend to organise themselves 
in ways outside the legal rules and accepted 
norms in an attempt to reach the overarching 
cultural norm of prosperity that ultimately 
underpins the dream in the first place. In 
many such cases we are not even speaking of 
getting rich, but merely of getting by. 
The sociologist Robert Merton wrote 
about those excluded by the American Dream 
as far back as the late 1930s. One of his main 
findings was precisely that people who could 
not achieve the dream of personal prosperity 
by the restricted avenues of legal means and 
norms would simply try to achieve that aim 
by illegal means. And why shouldn’t this be 
the case in a China that has moved from one 
of the most equal to one of the most unequal 
societies in the world in just a few decades? 
According to recent World Bank statistics, 
China has seen the GINI coefficient—the 
statistical estimate of relative equality and 
inequality—moving up from an equal 0.21 in 
1978 to an estimated highly unequal 0.61. The 
Chinese people and their ways of organising 
themselves in the face of this reality is 
tangible and no imagined theoretical ‘trap’. 
Underworld Countryside
The paradox of trying to prevent a civil 
society from organising itself from the 
grassroots in any legal manner has seen the 
unintended consequence of a rather uncivil 
type of society emerging from the bottom of 
contemporary Chinese society. The examples 
of such phenomena are too many to describe 
here, but let me take just a couple of examples 
from my new book Crime and the Chinese 
Dream (forthcoming in February 2018 with 
Hong Kong University Press). 
In the countryside, we see the emergence 
of a virtual criminal economy among the 
excluded. Earning money by illegal means 
has become common as the only way to ‘get 
rich’ or even just get by, and many parts of 
the countryside have come to be described 
as an ‘underworld countryside’. So-called 
‘criminal villages’ (fanzui cun) and criminal 
towns have emerged as people on the margins 
are struggling to fulfil the dream of relative 
prosperity in the only way available to them. 
In Fang Village in the south-east, so-called 
‘cake-uncles’ (bingshu) are running grand 
scams by carrying out sales with falsified 
account books—extending their fraudulent 
activities across China and making the village 
prosperous. The new mansions in the village 
are all built and owned by the fraudsters. The 
village girls all want to marry a ‘cake-uncle’ 
instead of a toiling peasant. The story is one 
where the village struggled with all kinds of 
legal means to gain prosperity before they 
found their criminal and profitable trade. 
Fang Village is not alone. 
A map of criminal villages in China shows 
a diversity of criminal activities from fraud, 
organised large-scale shoplifting, car theft, 
and burglary. In one much publicised example, 
a robbery village in Guangxi specialised in 
hand-cutting as a means of creating chaos and 
then utilised that chaos to rob people in the 
panic after their blood-letting attacks. The 
village robbers typically attacked crowded 
places like train stations or other locations 
where many people had gathered. The 
culprits then robbed and fled in the mayhem 
created by the incident. Other examples 
we can read about include drug-producing 
villages where the whole local economy is 
based on drug production and transportation, 
typically in poor provinces like Yunnan and 
Guangxi in the south-western drug belt 
areas. There are also weapon-making villages 
trading in illegal firearms. The list of criminal 
entrepreneurialism is diverse and wide 
ranging. 
I have recently been involved in a project 
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that looks at child kidnapping. The project 
has identified villages that base their local 
economy on the kidnapping of children 
for profit. We found that the children are 
typically under three years of age, and that 
there is a clear ‘division of labour’ among 
traffickers. The last link in the on-the-spot 
act of kidnapping is often an old woman 
who may look like the grandmother of the 
screaming kidnapped child, not creating any 
suspicion about the crime being committed. 
After the kidnapping, other perpetrators 
stand for the storage, transport, and final sale 
of the kids. The entire process is extremely 
well organised, with the police involved 
occupied looking in other directions. In this 
example it is worth noting that impunity 
is the rule for the kidnappers, and that 
the civil society occupied with organising 
and petitioning activities among parents is 
cracked down upon far more readily and 
effectively than the ‘uncivil’ organisations 
and networks in the criminal villages. The 
few solved child-kidnapping cases are shown 
on a special national TV show as ‘proof ’ of the 
effectiveness of the police. Parents, however, 
are not able to have the TV station run any 
unsolved cases, as the show only allows happy 
stories to be aired.
Criminal Advertisement
A snapshot from the ‘uncivil’ reality of the 
cities can be illustrated by a short stroll over 
a narrow footbridge in Guangzhou. I counted 
no less than two hundred and fifty illegal 
posters and stickers offering everything from 
false documents and stolen goods, to sexual 
scams and job ads for prostitutes. This is 
typical for many public spaces in the city—in 
the outlaying rural areas, the suburbs, and the 
central business districts. All posters, stickers 
and painted messages come with a mobile 
phone number that is impossible to trace by 
the police, and the high-ranking policemen 
I spoke with said they do nothing about this 
unless there is a genuine complaint from the 
public, and even then is there is not much that 
can be done. The regular police even blame 
the urban management teams (chengguan) 
for being responsible for the criminal posters 
problem. The chengguan on their side believe 
that it is the duty of the police to take down 
the posters, so they simply let it pass and 
refuse to do anything about the problem. The 
uncivil society, thus, has free advertisement 
walls all over the city and with a nearly one 
hundred percent chance of impunity. 
If the Cultural Revolution had its ‘big 
character posters’ (dazibao), and the late 
1970s and early 1980s had their ‘democracy 
walls’ (minzhu qiang), the Chinese Dream era 
has its own criminal poster walls (as well as 
bridges and all kinds of public spaces) with 
free ads for criminal activity. Such posters 
more or less dominate many cities in China 
today, and this kind of ‘uncivil society’ is 
allowed to spread. The walls are typically 
plastered with private commercial posters, 
job ads, and all kinds of announcements, legal 
and illegal alike. On many walls, recruitment 
posters for the army and the brothels stand 
side by side. The picture that accompanies 
this article shows several typical criminal 
posters, like the frequently displayed big red 
poster ads for recruiting male money boys and 
female prostitutes (concealed with inventive 
‘job descriptions’ such as ‘secretary’, ‘PR-
consultant’, ‘service worker’, ‘housemaid’ 
etc.). The job categories are easily recognised 
by the people in question as describing 
different forms of prostitution with promised 
earnings of up to sixty thousand yuan per 
month. 
Another poster at the bottom left of the 
photo pictures a beautiful twenty-nine-year-
old woman accompanied by a scam story of 
an unhappy marriage and a rich husband’s 
accident leading to the couple not being 
able to have a child. Half a million yuan (!) 
is promised to the person who can make 
her pregnant (after paying a ‘small fee’ of 
one thousand and two hundred yuan to the 
40 MADE IN CHINA - FOCUS
couple’s alleged lawyer). My colleague who 
speaks Cantonese with a northern accent 
phoned the number, met a woman on the line, 
and set up an appointment to meet her alleged 
lawyer at a hotel lobby the next day. He never 
went, but the scam became clear to us. The 
‘lawyer’ would disappear as soon as the fee 
was paid. I asked a policeman if people really 
buy this scam, and he confirmed that many do, 
and that they never receive any complaints 
because the betrayed ‘inseminator’ never 
dares come to the police with his foolish 
mistake. This type of scam has almost no 
chance of being targeted by the police, and 
this is well known among the perpetrators.
Uncivil Society Out of 
Control
Capitalism has come to China in the grand 
package of a Chinese Dream, and the crimes 
that follow are covered up by massively 
falsified crime statistics. According to data 
gathered a couple of years ago, in Guangzhou 
alone the real numbers of crime known to 
the police are falsified down to 2.5 percent 
in the official statistics, while 97.5 percent 
is concealed to the public. The falsification 
of numbers concerns petty crime as well as 
serious violent crime. The government is no 
longer fully in control of crime and ‘uncivil’ 
entrepreneurialism, but they care more about 
controlling the alleged ‘trap’ of civil society. 
In short, petitioning is more important to 
control than kidnapping. 
This situation recalls what Marx and Engels 
wrote in their Communist Manifesto about 
bourgeois society—that it is ‘like the sorcerer 
who is no longer able to control the powers of 
the nether world whom he has called up by his 
spells’. Both economies and norms change in 
this spiral of capitalist economic development 
(with Chinese characteristics), giving rise 
to ‘uncivil’ forms of entrepreneurialism. In 
such a whirlwind, the ‘nether world’ in Marx 
and Engels’ account may well translate into 
the ‘uncivil society’ shown in the criminal 
villages in the countryside and the criminal 
posters on the city walls. 
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China and Myanmar have been economic 
partners and allies for a long time. But this 
partnership is now being challenged by 
Myanmar’s democratisation process. Although 
nascent, Burmese civil society has shown it 
is ready to actively contest the legitimacy of 
China’s various development and commercial 
interests in this new democracy.
Burmese 
Civil Society 
Challenges China’s 
Development 
Assistance in 
Myanmar
The development landscape is shifting. 
China’s emergence as a non-traditional 
development donor is challenging traditional 
donor countries that are part of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of 
the Organisation for Economic Development 
Cooperation (OECD), such as Australia, 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. After many years of ambivalence, 
Beijing is renewing its engagement with its 
Southeast Asian neighbours in trade and 
development cooperation, a shift predicated 
not only upon the need for China to secure 
its energy supplies as the Chinese economy 
continues to expand, but also on the potential 
economic growth of these neighbouring 
countries, with their cheap labour and 
growing middle classes. Southeast Asia 
represents a market of six hundred million 
people for Chinese goods and services—a 
potentially significant boon for the slowing 
Chinese economy. Among these countries, 
since its transition to a civil government, 
Myanmar has had one of the highest growth 
rates in the region, exceeding seven percent 
per annum, a development that has been 
heavily driven by foreign direct investment. 
From a developmental perspective, Chinese 
aid and development assistance are nothing 
new, but over the years these instruments 
have shifted from being driven by ideology, 
as during the Maoist era, to a much more 
flexible and pragmatic approach. According 
to a recent report by the Asia Foundation, 
Chinese development assistance currently 
focuses on non-interference, mutual benefit, 
infrastructure-led growth, and demand-
driven cooperation. In Southeast Asia, China 
has provided a full range of assistance, 
including soft loans, debt cancellation, and 
the extension of lines of traditional credit. 
Moreover, the Chinese state has actively 
assisted and invested in the infrastructure 
of Southeast Asian nations. In the case 
of Myanmar, China has been a long-term 
economic partner and ally, but this partnership 
is now being challenged by Myanmar’s 
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democratisation process. Based on fieldwork 
observations conducted in Myanmar in the 
summer of 2016, in this article I first examine 
the role of Chinese development assistance 
and investments in the country’s transition, 
I then move on to consider how this role is 
perceived and challenged by an emerging but 
active Burmese civil society. While nascent, 
Burmese civil society has indeed shown that 
it is ready to actively contest the legitimacy of 
China’s various development and commercial 
interests in this new democracy. 
China and Myanmar: A 
Strained Relationship
China is Myanmar’s most significant and 
largest investor to date. China’s relationship 
with Myanmar is primarily driven by 
Beijing’s need to secure resources for its own 
development, as the country offers China a 
wealth of natural resources and is strategically 
located. Gas and oil routed through the Indian 
Ocean into Myanmar and on to China reduce 
Chinese dependence on the Middle East and 
on the unsafe passage through the Malacca 
Strait. While the expansion of the Chinese 
economy has slowed considerably, the desire 
to sustain growth demands that China secure 
not only resources, but also a market for its 
goods. The Burmese economy is forecast to 
grow at 8.6 percent in 2016, with similar 
projections for 2017, presenting a significant 
opportunity for Chinese manufacturers. 
For this reason, much of China’s 
development assistance remains framed 
as economic cooperation, a situation that 
has failed to win the support of Burmese 
society. Large-scale projects such as the 
Myitisone Dam, the Letpadaung Copper 
Mine, and the Kyaukphyu Gas Pipeline have 
drawn the attention and opposition of civil 
society representatives. Chinese companies, 
such as the China Power Investment (CPI) 
have been accused of not providing enough 
safeguards against environmental damage, 
nor appropriate compensation to affected 
communities. The Irrawaddy River, where 
the dam was to be located, is seen as the 
birthplace of the nation. Given the Irrawaddy’s 
cultural and historical significance, the lack 
of consultation prior to the initiation of the 
dam project further strengthened the claims 
against CPI. In addition, accusations of land 
grabs and contracts that favour the Chinese 
have increased anti-Chinese sentiments in 
Myanmar. 
The Chinese are seeking to make amends. 
The Chinese Embassy in Yangon has instructed 
all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operating 
in Myanmar to undertake corporate social 
responsibility training. The China National 
Petroleum Corporation, the SOE responsible 
for the Kyaukphyu pipeline, has established a 
Pipeline Friendship Association in Myanmar 
to address local grievances that pertain to the 
pipeline. These types of actions have proved 
insufficient to address continuing concerns 
and the demands of Burmese civil society. 
For instance, a 2016 delegation from CPI that 
was accompanied by the Chinese Ambassador 
Hong Liang to Myitkyina township, Kachin 
state, to meet with local officials and residents 
attracted protests; while the restarting of 
the Letpadaung mine elicited outcry and 
further protests in May 2016. The inability of 
the Chinese to win over Burmese support is 
an indication of not only a failure to address 
the asymmetry in its engagement with 
Myanmar, but also its failure to recognise 
the importance of the country’s increasingly 
active civil society.
The Resistance of Local 
Actors
As a long-standing partner of Myanmar 
during its years of international isolation, 
China’s engagement with the country has 
reached a critical juncture. Now more than 
ever, Beijing needs to re-frame its partnership 
to incorporate a new development component, 
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one that seeks to address the existing 
asymmetry and provides opportunities for all 
stakeholders to be part of the development, 
notably civil society groups and communities 
that are affected by Chinese economic 
interests. Indeed, Chinese involvement in 
Myanmar must be seen in the context of 
the country’s political transition, which is 
providing new space and opportunities for 
local civil society. 
Burmese civil society stakeholders have 
pushed their country’s new democratic 
government for accountability and 
transparency in its deals with the Chinese, 
particularly considering that the Chinese 
authorities have in the past supported the 
military dictatorship. Moreover, while the 
Chinese government, NGOs, and investors 
have the capacity to deliver sustainable 
development and to be effective development 
partners with the Burmese, the asymmetrical 
nature of the Sino-Burmese partnership—
firmly tilted in favour of China’s economic, 
political, and strategic interests—is starting 
to change. In re-engaging with the world 
and re-establishing its international 
connections, Myanmar is diversifying its 
sources of economic, social, and political 
support, thereby reducing its dependency on 
China. In addition, China’s own democratic 
deficits are significant impediments to its 
overseas development assistance policies, 
especially considering the fact that the 
Chinese authorities prefer government-to-
government development cooperation. This 
form of partnership often illuminates China’s 
democratic deficiencies rather than hiding 
them and is, therefore, hardly acceptable to 
local Burmese civil society. 
As mentioned above, the activism of 
Myanmar’s emerging civil society has already 
had an impact on Chinese economic interests 
in the country. The Thein Sein government’s 
decision to shelve the China-backed 
Myitsone Dam on the Irrawaddy River in 
late 2011 is generally attributed to opposition 
from Burmese civil society, based on worries 
about irreversible environmental damage 
and displacement of communities. Fieldwork 
interviews in 2016 with Burmese civil society 
representatives engaged across a number of 
fields—from corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) to political transition—suggest that 
there is a tendency to look towards the West, in 
particular the United States, for development 
assistance. This is principally out of concern 
for China’s top-down approach to economic 
development cooperation. Interviews with 
people working in the Burmese NGO sector 
suggest that the Chinese state—in its various 
guises—is perceived as lacking the know-
how and skills to effectively engage with 
Burmese civil society, a perception that is 
also jeopardising China’s legitimacy and 
its status as an economic and development 
partner. According to an NGO representative 
working in Myanmar’s CSR sector, campaigns 
to improve the Chinese image and attempts 
to engage with Burmese civil society in 
the wake of large-scale protests against a 
number of Chinese-backed projects have, 
thus far, proved weak and ineffectual. For 
example, despite providing public access 
to its Environment Management Plan for 
the Letpadaung Copper Mine, Wanbao, the 
Chinese mining company that owns the site, 
was not able to quell protests from local 
villagers claiming environmental damage and 
inadequate compensation.
Finally, another factor that should not 
be discounted in the relationship between 
the two countries is that Chinese economic 
interests in Myanmar are threatened by the 
ethnic conflicts taking place across the Yunnan 
border. For example, the conflict between 
the ethnic Kachin and the Burmese army 
threatens not only Chinese internal security—
with some sixty thousand displaced people 
entering Yunnan since conflict intensified in 
early 2015—but also China’s strategic oil and 
gas supply pipelines.
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Looking Forward
China’s political culture has always shaped 
the manner in which Beijing has engaged 
with other nations. This has entailed a strong 
preference for state-to-state relationships. 
Myanmar’s reforms have opened up new space 
for local civil society actors and the media, 
all of which have become roadblocks for 
furthering Chinese interests in the country. 
China was slow to recognise the influence of 
civil society on domestic politics and Burmese 
development, and Burmese civil society 
representatives have grown increasingly 
sceptical regarding Chinese claims of mutual 
benefit and South-South cooperation. Still, 
although it has little to offer in terms of 
values associated with development, such 
as good governance and accountability, 
China does have a significant development 
experience to share, having lifted over seven 
hundred million people out of poverty in 
just two decades. And yet, in spite of this, 
both domestic and international civil society 
activists working in Myanmar question the 
extent to which the Chinese state and its 
various stakeholders will be of assistance to 
their country. Extrapolating further, we can 
also speculate that, if and when Chinese civil 
society stakeholders begin to play a bigger 
role in delivering development assistance to 
Myanmar, questions will surely abound as 
to the autonomy of Chinese civil society 
organisations from the party-state. All of 
this is likely to continue to restrain Chinese 
economic and development cooperation in 
Myanmar. 
Nevertheless, China has started to 
acknowledge the importance of engaging 
civil society actors to deepen cooperation 
with its neighbours. As a mechanism for 
building trust and cooperation at the 
regional level, China and the Association for 
Southeast Asian Nations established a high-
level, people-to-people dialogue, involving 
civil society representatives from across the 
region. The first meeting was held in 2013 in 
the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, and 
was organised by the China NGO Network for 
International Exchange (CNIE), an umbrella 
organisation for China’s leading non-profit 
social organisations. The second meeting, 
held in 2015 in Nusa Dua, Bali, paved the way 
for the establishment of an NGO network 
responsible for organising future rotating 
dialogues. Moreover, the China Foundation 
for Poverty Alleviation, one of China’s largest 
NGOs, opened its second international office 
in Yangon in August 2016. Such measures 
suggest that a possible re-framing of Chinese 
development efforts is underway. This, in the 
future, may open up greater space for both 
Chinese and Burmese NGOs to cooperate on 
development projects and, thus, build trust 
and goodwill between the two countries.
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Sometimes the plans to improve people’s 
lives end up destroying them. When the 
Chinese government moved the nomadic 
Evenki people from the forests into urban 
settlements and confiscated their hunting 
rifles, they took away their livelihood. Gu 
Tao’s film The Last Moose of Aoluguya 
documents how people survive, or slowly 
destroy themselves, after the catastrophe 
of losing their world. 
Losing the World
After the Moose Have 
Gone Away
Christian Sorace
Man is the being through whom nothingness 
comes to the world 
Jean-Paul Sartre
Gu Tao’s documentary The Last Moose 
of Aoluguya (an da han) (2013) follows the 
life of Weijia, an Evenki hunter, artist, and 
alcoholic who Gu Tao described as ‘the most 
lonely person in the forest’. Traditionally, the 
Evenki, also known as Tungus in Russia, are 
a culture of nomadic hunters that span the 
trans-Baikal region, Siberian taiga, Mongolia, 
and the forests of northern China. Although 
mainly concentrated in Russia, in the People’s 
Republic of China there were 30,875 Evenkis 
as of the 2010 population census. In the forests 
of China’s Great Xing’an ling Mountains 
(daxing anling), the lives of the Evenki have 
revolved around moose hunting and reindeer 
herding. 
In 2003, the Chinese government relocated 
the Evenki from the forest into new 
settlements in nearby townships as part of a 
broader campaign of ‘ecological migration’ 
(shengtai wenming). The relocation policy 
hoped to accomplish the interrelated goals 
of protecting nature, while providing 
indigenous people with new apartments and 
urban amenities, folded into a larger plan of 
accelerating regional economic development. 
As part of the urbanisation process, the 
government confiscated the Evenkis’ hunting 
rifles and banned hunting. For this reason, 
Weijia asserts that the Evenki hunter lifestyle 
is guilty before the law that confiscated 
their guns and evicted them from their land: 
‘I heard about four young hunters who got 
arrested for hunting. That was the end of our 
culture. They put us on trial. Guilty! Just drink 
myself to death. We’ll just have to get used to 
it.’ Weijia’s life occupies the ambivalent no 
man’s land between dying and adaption. 
Not only are the Evenkis prohibited from 
hunting, there are no longer any moose to 
hunt. The local moose population has either 
been killed by illegal poachers (Weijia 
insinuates that the poachers are mainly Han 
Chinese) or migrated elsewhere due to de-
forestation. In the movie, Weijia and his 
friend Mao Xia search the forest in vain for 
signs of moose. All they find are sun bleached 
moose bones and rusted poacher traps, but no 
trace of living presence.
The disappearance of the moose means 
extinction for the Evenki. Uprooted from 
the forest, the Evenki culture is preserved 
only in the form of cultural representations 
and museum artefacts. In the movie, we see 
Drawing by Gu Tao, charcoal pencil on bark, 
2015
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Weijia watching propaganda performances 
and television documentaries celebrating 
the vitality and economic development of 
the Evenki culture under Communist Party 
leadership. 
Blood Relatives
 
We can learn about the Evenki’s 
contemporary predicament by looking across 
the ocean at the history of genocide and 
sedenterisation of Native American nations 
in the United States. Despite a prevalent 
impulse among China watchers to blame 
China for all of the world’s human rights 
violations, the destruction of indigenous 
culture is not particularly Chinese, Maoist, 
or authoritarian. The Chinese Communist 
Party’s (CCP) tyranny of progress is only one 
variant of settler colonialism. In the United 
States, the genocide of the Native Americans 
was arguably more extensive, violent, and 
merciless than the complex and uneven 
histories of the CCP’s policies and treatment 
of its minority populations, which were at 
least formulated under the banner of socialist 
equality. 
The eradication of indigenous cultures also 
belongs to the histories of the moose in the 
forests of Hulunbuir and bison in the Dakota 
plains. In her book Dispatches from Dystopia: 
Histories of Places Not Yet Forgotten, 
historian Kate Brown argues: ‘The story of 
Custer and his defeat by Crazy Horse at the 
battle of Little Big Horn is well known. So, 
too, are his infamous trips through the plains 
shooting bison and leaving the stench of 
rotting flesh . . . Custer was one of a number of 
Americans who felt that the extermination of 
the buffalo would inspire the Indians to settle 
down.’ For pastoral nations like the Sioux, 
Cheyenne, and Crow, the end of the buffalo 
meant the end of their way of life. In the 
haunting words of Plenty Coup, the leader of 
the Crow Nation at the end of nineteenth and 
turn of the twentieth centuries: ‘But when the 
buffalo went away the hearts of my people fell 
to the ground, and they could not lift them up 
again. After this nothing happened.’
In his book Radical Hope: Ethics in the 
Face of Cultural Devastation, philosopher 
Jonathan Lear interprets Plenty Coup’s 
statement to mean that life for the Crow 
went on after the buffalo died, but there was 
no longer a world in which actions could be 
ascribed familiar meanings. As Lear explains, 
the same action that meant one thing in the 
past (display of martial valour and courage) 
meant an entirely different thing on the 
reservation (an illegal and barbaric practice). 
The only bridge between these two worlds 
is one of memory and loss. Similarly, life 
for the Evenki continues in the settlements, 
and Weijia’s life continued when he moved 
to Hainan to pursue a marriage based on 
an advertisement his mother placed in the 
newspaper, but it is life without a world. 
The end of the world does not mean the 
end of state violence because new and 
counter-worlds will always be born from the 
memories of the past. As I write this essay 
in February 2017, the United States federal 
government, US Army Corps of Engineers, in 
tandem with oil corporations are preparing to 
build an oil pipeline (Dakota Access Pipeline 
or DAPL) through the Standing Rock Sioux 
Reservation’s sacred burial grounds 
despite massive and ongoing protests and 
environmental concerns. At an earlier stage 
in the conflict in November 2016, militarised 
police deployed tear gas, rubber bullets, 
concussion grenades, and water cannons 
on peaceful protestors and encampments 
of ‘water protectors’ composed of over two 
hundred indigenous nations. In China, Inner 
Mongolian grasslands are being devastated 
in part due to extensive coal mining 
operations. Increasingly frequent protests by 
ethnic Mongolians over the loss of traditional 
grazing lands are inevitably greeted by riot 
police. 
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Alcoholism
The possibility of rebuilding a new world 
requires political resistance, organisation, and 
hope, without which there is despair. Unable 
to maintain their traditional livelihoods, 
marooned in townships with bleak economic 
prospects, many Evenkis became alcoholics. 
In an interview, Gu Tao stated that drinking 
was ‘everywhere in the forest. Everybody 
was drinking, so much that alcohol seemed 
to permeate the air. I wanted to capture this 
aspect of their lives, and the accompanying 
loss of their traditional way of life. This loss 
caused suffering which is the reason they 
turned to alcohol.’
Weijia is an alcoholic because his world is 
over. In the film, he is clearly, and in his own 
words, ‘drinking himself to death’. Aware 
that he is destroying himself, he embraces the 
decision as the only one available to him in 
lieu of a world and out of fidelity to the past. 
‘The guns were gone after we moved, we had 
nothing to do, so we started drinking. Drinking 
heavily. People started dying. Already eight of 
us have died. Eight of us have fucking died 
from drink. We’re lost. Our culture, our guns 
are gone. So we drink.’
Drinking in this context is not a response 
to boredom. Weijia is indeed busy throughout 
the film. He tends to reindeer, gets married, 
writes poetry, half-heartedly attends an 
English lesson. Although being busy keeps 
him alive, it does not relieve him from the 
knowledge, which is a permanent ache and 
void, that his world no longer exists. It is 
also clear from the film that drinking does 
not numb the pain but in fact heightens it. 
Weijia confesses that if he does not drink, he 
is unable to speak—which is to say, drinking 
immerses him in reverie about the past, where 
speech is meaningful. 
Weijia is not drinking to forget; he is drinking 
to remember. His drunkenness prevents him 
from being reconciled to the world being 
thrust upon him. He is frequently kicked out 
of the settlement for drinking; he is unable to 
sustain his marriage; because of drinking, his 
new projects are doomed to failure. In this 
light, alcoholism becomes a self-conscious 
mode of sabotage and refusal of a world in 
which he is a stranger. ‘To be fucking honest, 
it’s like those Japanese samurai [author’s 
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Wei Jia and an elder hunter, in a still from The 
Last Moose of Aoluguya.
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note: he makes a cutting sound to mimic 
the practice of seppuku] … Let me just say it 
straight, to lose your culture, it’s like losing 
everything and so we begin to wither away. 
Drink! Just drink yourself to death.’ These are 
not incoherent ramblings but clear-sighted 
insights into the choices available to him 
(perhaps it is when we believe we are sober 
that we can trick ourselves more effectively 
into accepting the unacceptable). For Weijia, 
to stop drinking would betray the past. 
Weijia’s alcoholism is neither romantic nor 
pathological. As he puts it, ‘I’m not afraid of 
being poisoned, that’s what drinking is. If you 
don’t get poisoned, then what’s the point?’ 
Following Lear’s argument about the Crow, I 
suggest that Weijia’s self-destructiveness is 
not psychological, but an objective assessment 
of his (non)place in the world: ‘We live in a 
modern society now, it’s swallowed us up. Our 
hunting culture is disappearing. The society 
is becoming industrialised, and turning the 
world into a miserable place. If the police 
of a civilised world, shot at me, then I’d say, 
“Go ahead, shoot!”’ The wish to die is not a 
rejection of himself but of the world on offer. 
It seems that Weijia is not only mourning 
the loss of his traditional lifestyle but is 
also cognizant of the violence of the world 
promised to replace it. What kind of world is 
he being asked to join? 
On Extinction and Being 
Human 
Why is the fate of nomadic, reindeer people 
in the remote regions of Inner Mongolia 
so haunting? When we watch Weijia’s self-
destruction on the screen, we see people 
that we know, including our own future 
possibilities. Gu Tao rejects the label of being 
an ‘anthropological filmmaker’, I suspect 
in part because Weijia’s situation of living 
amidst cultural collapse belongs to the human 
condition. Undoubtedly, the world is full 
of cultural plurality, textures and contexts, 
meanings and misunderstandings, norms and 
transgressions, all of which require detailed 
attention to, and knowledge of, the local. But 
details are not discrete fortresses impervious 
to collapse—they are fragile dwellings built 
on the edge of a void.
No one expects that their world will 
disappear. The possibility that the world can 
collapse is probably the kind of knowledge that 
Nietzsche suggested we must forget to remain 
alive. The cultural extinction of the Evenki is 
an extreme example, but collapses of different 
scales and intensities are happening all the 
time. When a factory shutters in a remote 
town due to capital flight and takes people’s 
prospects at a better life along with it, is 
this not also a form of world collapse? When 
residents must permanently evacuate their 
villages in Alaska because of climate change, 
do their worlds remain intact apart from the 
place that held them together? When Weijia 
is living in China’s southern island of Hainan, 
he remarks, ‘I’m not interested in the sites 
here. The big hotels… that has nothing to do 
with me. I’m just interested in local villages’ 
and their customs and ways of life. Perhaps 
his motivation to research other villages was 
driven by a sensibility of camaraderie through 
the shared experience of loss and precarity. 
Perhaps he wanted to find other possibilities 
for coping with extinction. 
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Andrew Kipnis’ new book, From Village to 
City: Social Transformation in Chinese County 
Seat (University of California Press, 2016), paints 
an extraordinary portrait of Zouping, a county 
in Shandong province, challenging our current 
understandings of modernity and putting 
forward a new theory of urbanisation. For our 
Academic Watch, we spoke with the author. 
Why did you choose to study Zouping?
ANDREW KIPNIS: I originally went to Zouping 
county in 1988 when I was a PhD student, 
before I had even decided exactly what project 
I would complete for my PhD degree. I had just 
finished my preliminary exams and was studying 
Chinese at Nanjing University, when one of my 
PhD supervisors was given an opportunity to 
do a project in a village in Zouping county and 
invited me to tag along as research assistant. At 
that time, Zouping had been selected by Chinese 
officials as a county where American social 
Andrew Kipnis on 
From Village to City
scientists could do research, so I did not really 
choose the place, it was my only option. But since 
I started doing research there, I established 
relationships with many people and found the 
research environment good. My discussions 
with researchers working in other parts of 
the country led me to conclude that, though 
Zouping was a place that had been approved by 
the Chinese government for researchers, it was 
not terribly different from many other parts of 
the country. Over the years, as I have read about 
and visited many other parts of China, I gained a 
firm grasp on the ways in which Zouping differs 
from and resembles other places. After my 
dissertation research, I continued to return to 
Zouping as often as I could. From 1999 onwards, 
most of my time was spent in the county seat. I 
observed the rapid urbanisation that took place 
there and thought that I should write a book 
about it.
How do places like Zouping challenge our 
current understandings of modernity?
AK: The term modernity means different 
things to different theorists. In the book, I 
summarise theories of modernity by grouping 
them into three types. The first is classical 
theories, which portray modernity as an all-
encompassing historical rupture that occurs 
when predominantly agricultural societies 
urbanise and industrialise. Next comes second-
wave theories, which observe shifts that occur 
after industrialisation and urbanisation in 
Europe, and posit ever newer ‘modernities’ to go 
with these changes. Third are cyclical theories 
of modernity, which postulate that any place in 
the world where capital is accumulating will feel 
modern, that features of modernity, like a belief in 
progress and planning, move from place to place as 
capital shifts around the world. In the discipline 
of anthropology, most theorists abandoned 
the concept of modernity because debates 
over the term had become too convoluted and 
criticisms of the expression too numerous. But 
in observing Zouping’s relatively simultaneous 
industrialisation, urbanisation, demographic 
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transition, consumer revolution, and increases 
in educational and bureaucratic structures, I 
felt drawn by the term’s comparative strengths. 
While I agreed with many of the criticisms, I 
felt that classic modernisation theory especially 
raised important questions for understanding 
Zouping’s social transformations. So I strived to 
develop a theory of modernisation that addressed 
some of the criticisms without abandoning the 
term altogether. Within anthropology, many 
theorists simply did not discuss places like 
Zouping, which were undergoing many of the 
social transformations associated with a classic 
modernisation. In the field of China studies, 
most of the literature on urbanisation focuses on 
the Pearl River Delta, Shanghai, and Beijing. But 
Shanghai and Beijing, like the other major cities 
in China, are de-industrialising, and the Pearl 
River Delta urbanised and industrialised in a 
relatively peculiar manner—it relied primarily on 
foreign capital and workers from other provinces 
while the local rural population became a 
privileged rentier class. In Zouping, there was 
the combination of industrialisation, primarily 
local capital, and a local rural population that 
became a proletariat. This type of urbanisation 
has not received the attention that it deserves.
In the introduction, you quote from Marcel 
Proust’s Recherche. What does Proust have to 
tell us about a Chinese rural county today?
AK: Quoting Proust is one of the ways in which 
I bring the literature on classic modernisation 
into the discussion. Proust wrote about a time 
when the social transformations associated 
with industrialisation and urbanisation in 
France were proceeding rapidly. He focused 
on the topic of memory in relation to these 
transformations. I wanted to raise the topic of 
memory because it is an important aspect of 
social transformation. What are the social and 
psychological functions of memory in a place 
undergoing rapid technological, social, and 
economic change? In the particular passage 
I quote, Proust links memory to both the 
psychological construction of one’s ego and the 
place of concrete technologies from the past in 
the process of constructing the ego. In the book, 
I raise questions about the place of nostalgia for 
bygone technologies and modes of life among 
Zouping’s residents.
One of the central concepts that you 
introduce in the book is that of ‘recombinant’ 
urbanisation. What do you mean by that?
AK: My use of the word recombinant is a way 
of emphasising a central fact about all forms of 
transformation—that transformation includes 
the recycling and recombination of existing 
parts of a given entity, along with the integration 
of new items. Too often, classic theories of 
modernity wrote about social transformations 
as if they were acts of replacement instead 
of transformation. Instead of saying that 
industrial/urban society was built out of bits 
and pieces of rural/agricultural society, they 
tended to rely on tropes of complete contrast 
which implied that industrial/urban society was 
completely different to the past societies out of 
which it developed. Just think of the children’s 
toy—the Transformers. You can transform 
them from a human-like robot into a car, truck 
or airplane by twisting the individual bits. A 
proper transformation requires the coordinated 
shifting of all of the original pieces. But no part is 
simply replaced by something else and many of 
the properties of the transformed entity are still 
marked by their original form. Now the analogy 
of the toy has its limit. With the toy there are no 
new pieces incorporated from the outside and 
the entire process is consciously guided by the 
person playing with the toy. But still, this is a 
better understanding of social transformation 
than one that implies the simple replacement of 
one thing by another. My interest in memory—
individual, social, and political—relates to my 
interest in processes of social transformation. 
Memory is one of the ways in which slices of the 
past are recombined to construct the present.
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